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I. INTRODUCTION
In the past, when a patent owner proved infringement, it was effectively
presumed that the harm to the patentee was irreparable and that the
infringing conduct should be enjoined. This practice was viewed as
appropriate because a patent provides only the right to “exclude others”
from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing the patented
invention—essentially, the right to protect one’s market exclusivity or
market share.1 The Supreme Court put a stop to this practice in eBay Inc.
v. MercExchange, LL.C., where it held that “the decision whether to grant
or deny injunctive relief … must be exercised consistent with traditional
principles of equity,” which includes consideration of whether the plaintiff
“has suffered an irreparable injury” and whether “remedies available at
law … are inadequate to compensate for that injury.”2
EBay, by requiring consideration and balancing of various equitable
factors, made injunctions considerably more difficult to obtain than under
the “general rule” “that a permanent injunction will issue once infringement
and validity have been adjudged” that was previously applied by the Federal
Circuit.3 Post-eBay, patentees that do not participate in the market for
their own inventions are unlikely to be irreparably harmed by infringement.
1. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006) (“Every patent shall . . . grant to the patentee . . .
the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention
throughout the United States . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. § 283 (“The several courts
having jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant injunctions in accordance with the
principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms
as the court deems reasonable.” (emphasis added)); see also U.S. Const. art I., § 8., cl. 8
(providing that Congress shall have the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries” (emphasis added)).
2. 547 U.S. 388, 391, 394 (2006). The eBay Court expressed the four-factor test
as follows:
According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a permanent
injunction must satisfy a four factor test before a court may grant such relief.
A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2)
that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to
compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships
between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that
the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.
Id. at 391.
3. Id. at 393–94 (stating that the Federal Circuit “Court of Appeals [erred in]
depart[ing] in the opposite direction from the four-factor test” for permanent injunctive
relief in patent cases) (quoting MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338
(Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated, 547 U.S. 388 (2006))) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Indeed, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer,
wrote separately in eBay to make the point that injunctions may not be
appropriate “[where] firms use patents not as a basis for producing and
selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.”4
A market-participating patentee’s loss of market share, however,
remained a viable way to prove irreparable harm post-eBay.5 The Federal
Circuit has made clear that “even though a successful patent infringement
plaintiff can no longer rely on presumptions or other short-cuts to support
a request for a permanent injunction, it does not follow that courts should
entirely ignore the fundamental nature of patents as property rights granting
the owner the right to exclude.”6 The court still recognized a patentee’s
loss of market share to an infringer in direct competition with the patentee
as all but requiring an injunction.7
But now this avenue to injunctive relief has been severely curtailed.
In Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co. (Apple I),8 the Federal Circuit
endorsed a “nexus” requirement for determining whether a patent owner
has suffered irreparable harm of lost market share as a result of
infringement.9 This new hurdle to injunctive relief, which the court
borrowed from analogous damages law, will likely prove exceedingly
difficult to satisfy where a patented feature comprises only a portion of a

4. Id. at 396–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy was expressing his
concern about cases involving patentees that are nonpracticing entities—particularly the
relatively new “industry” of so-called “patent trolls”—that are aggressively enforcing
patents and had been leveraging the possibility of injunctive relief to extort unreasonably
high settlement license fees. Id.; see also z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F.
Supp. 2d 437, 441 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (justifying the conclusion that monetary damages
sufficiently compensated the patent holder based on Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in
eBay).
5. See, e.g., i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 861–62 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (“Past harm to a patentee’s market share, revenues, and brand recognition is
relevant for determining whether the patentee ‘has suffered an irreparable injury.’ … In
this case, the district court properly considered strong circumstantial evidence that
Microsoft’s infringement rendered i4i’s product obsolete for much of the custom XML
market, causing i4i to lose market share and change its business strategy to survive.”
(emphasis omitted) (quoting eBay, 547 U.S. at 391)), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011).
6. Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
7. Id. at 1150–51 (“[T]he [district] court committed a clear error of judgment
when it concluded that Bosch failed to demonstrate irreparable harm in the face of
overwhelming evidence to the contrary. This is particularly true in light of Bosch’s
evidence of: (1) the parties’ direct competition; (2) loss in market share and access to
potential customers resulting from Pylon’s introduction of infringing beam blades; and
(3) Pylon’s lack of financial wherewithal to satisfy a judgment. Given these facts, there
is ‘no basis on which the district court rationally could have’ concluded that Bosch failed
to show irreparable harm.”
8. 678 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
9. Id. at 1324.
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larger accused product. Because most patents are not directed to entire
products or systems but only a portion thereof, the nexus requirement
would likely preclude injunctive relief in the vast majority of cases.
Some particularly vulnerable cases are those involving technologies such
as consumer electronics, software, telecommunications, heavy machinery,
robotics, logistics, and transportation, all of which tend to involve complex
multifaceted products and systems.
Part II of this Article discusses the Apple I preliminary injunction
proceedings and explores how the nexus requirement came to be announced
and applied. It demonstrates that legitimate policy concerns appear to
have motivated the creation of the nexus requirement, which insists that
patentees satisfy a high burden of proving that the patented feature drives
the demand for the infringing product in order to demonstrate irreparable
harm redressable via an injunction. Part III discusses a subsequent appeal—
Apple II—of another preliminary injunction decision in the Apple v.
Samsung case and explains how the nexus requirement was clarified to
be satisfied only with affirmative proof of nexus, not proof that the absence
of a feature would somehow diminish demand or value. Part IV explains
the entire market value rule precedent for patent infringement damages
and juxtaposes it with the nexus requirement. It shows that the Apple I
and Apple II decisions adopt concepts and verbiage from the entire market
value rule cases, which preclude patentees from collecting damages based
on an entire multicomponent product unless it can be shown that the
patented feature drives the consumer demand for the entire product—a
very high burden that is rarely satisfied. Part V looks at injunction decisions
subsequent to Apple I to see how courts have applied the nexus requirement
in other cases and shows that where the equities suggest an injunction is
appropriate, courts are finding ways to skirt or even ignore the nexus
requirement. Part VI follows the proceedings in the Apple v. Samsung
case concerning Apple’s request for and the denial of permanent injunctive
relief following the findings of infringement by Samsung, including
Apple’s third appeal to the Federal Circuit surrounding the nexus issue.
Part VI also includes a discussion of advisable ways to relax the rigidness
and potential inequity of the nexus test by, for example, (1) recasting the
way that nexus considerations are analyzed under eBay by addressing
them outside the context of irreparable harm; (2) allowing nexus to be
considered in the aggregate where multiple patents are infringed by a
single product; and (3) encouraging more flexible injunctions to be entered
that enjoin only the infringing features and allow time for those features

157

to be designed around before the injunction goes into effect. Part VII
briefly considers the panel decision in the Apple III appeal, showing that
the decision is inconsistent with the prior Apple nexus decisions, leaving
the nexus issue for en banc consideration. Part VIII concludes.
II. APPLE I: PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION PROCEEDINGS AND THE
ORIGIN OF THE “NEXUS” REQUIREMENT
This Part will discuss the background of the litigation between Apple
and Samsung through the preliminary injunction phase of the case. It
explains the preliminary injunction determinations for Apple’s various
patents as they relate to the new “nexus” requirement for proving
irreparable harm. The origin, cited legal support, and apparent policy
considerations for the nexus requirement are addressed.
A. District Court Proceedings
Apple and Samsung have long been involved in massive high-profile
litigation surrounding Apple’s patents covering its ubiquitous iPad and
iPhone products.10 The following are representative figures of the design
patents-in-suit, alongside some of the Samsung accused products.

U.S. PATENT NO. D504,889 / SAMSUNG GALAXY TAB 10.111

10. See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK, 2011
WL 7036077 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2011), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 678 F.3d 1314.
11. Id. at *1–2.
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U.S. PATENT NOS. D593,087 & D618,667/
SAMSUNG GALAXY S 4G & INFUSE 4G12
Additionally, Apple asserted a design patent covering a graphical user
interface for its iPhone products.13

U.S. PATENT NO. D604,305

12. Id. at *1–2, 17.
13. See Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co. (Apple III Dist.), 909 F. Supp. 2d 1147,
1151 (N.D. Cal. 2012), rev’d, 727 F.3d 1214 (Fed. Cir. 2013); U.S. Patent No. D604,305
S (filed Nov. 17, 2009).
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Apple also asserted utility patents against Samsung that covered
various user interface features of its products’ touch screens. These patents
included U.S. Patent No. 7,469,381, which covers a software feature
where a user of a smartphone scrolls past the end of a document and the
document appears to “bounce back”; U.S. Patent No. 7,844,915, which
covers multitouch gestures, for example, when a user can “pinch to zoom”
and enlarge a document or image on a screen; and U.S. Patent No.
7,864,163, which covers the ability for a user to “double-tap to zoom,”
that is, center and enlarge a portion of an image or document by doubletapping the desired area with the user’s finger.14
Apple moved for a preliminary injunction at the district court before
Judge Lucy Koh, contending that Apple’s designs were innovative and
distinctive and that Samsung’s sales of infringing smartphones and tablets
caused irreparable harm to Apple in the form of, inter alia, lost market
share.15 Apple emphasized that it and Samsung were in direct competition
for customers and that sales of smartphones and tablets have long-term
downstream effects on subsequent smartphone and tablet purchases due
to customers’ desires to maintain compatibility with previous purchases
of software and accessories.16 Particularly in the tablet market, where
Apple and Samsung together dominated the industry, it was clear “that a
sale to Samsung translate[d] to a lost sale to Apple.”17
The district court denied Apple’s motion regarding the ’889 (iPad) and
’087 (iPhone) patents due to validity-related issues, which prevented a
finding of a likelihood of success on the merits.18 Although the district
court found the ’667 (iPhone) patent likely valid and infringed, the district
court denied Apple’s request for a preliminary injunction because Apple
failed to establish a “nexus” between Apple’s loss of market share and
Samsung’s alleged infringement.19 In particular,
[t]he [district] court found that despite Apple’s evidence that “product design
generally is at least one factor, and for some people may be the primary factor,
influencing a person’s decision to purchase a smartphone,” other evidence
indicated that the “driver in consumer demand may be the novelty of the product,
and not necessarily the design,” and that “smartphone buyers are motivated to
purchase products for a whole host of reasons.”20

14.
7036077.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
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See Apple I, 678 F.3d at 1318; Amended Complaint at 7–8, Apple, 2011 WL
See Apple I, 678 F.3d at 1320.
See id. at 1320, 1336–37.
Id. at 1336.
Id. at 1319–22.
Id. at 1321.
Id. (emphasis added).
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Thus, Apple’s motion for a preliminary injunction was denied with
respect to the ’667 (iPhone) patent as well. Interestingly, the district court
noted that “design mattered more to consumers in tablets than in
smartphones.”21
As to the utility patent directed to the bounce-back software feature,
the district court again denied Apple’s motion for a preliminary injunction,
finding no proof of nexus because “Apple has neither alleged, nor
established, that the ’381 patent is either necessary to, or a core functionality
of, the products that it seeks to enjoin. Nor has Apple shown that
consumers’ purchasing decisions are based on the existence of a snap
back feature protected by the ’381 patent.”22
1. The District Court’s Basis for the Nexus Requirement
Judge Koh explained the basis for the nexus requirement as follows:
In addition to showing injury, Apple must establish a nexus between Apple’s
harm of lost customers and loss in market share and Samsung’s allegedly
infringing conduct. See Quad/Tech, Inc. v. Q.I. Press Controls B. V., 701 F.
Supp. 2d 644, 657 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (“Quad/Tech has failed to prove a causal
relation between alleged loss and alleged infringement, which is necessary to
prove irreparable harm, and it failed to prove lost sales arising from the
Defendants’ alleged sale of a markless registration control system.”); z4 Techs.,
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 440–41 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (finding
no irreparable harm in part because “it is not likely that any consumer of
Microsoft’s Windows or Office software purchases these products for their
product activation functionality”); cf. i4i, 598 F.3d at 861 (upholding district
court’s conclusion that “i4i was irreparably injured by Microsoft’s infringement,
based on its factual findings that Microsoft and i4i were direct competitors in
the custom XML market, and that i4i lost market share as a result of the
infringing Word products”) (emphasis added); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc.,
653 F.3d 976, 981–82 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that there must be a causal
connection between the violation and the harm alleged in order to establish
irreparable harm in copyright infringement case).23

The cases cited by Judge Koh in this passage are inapposite, nonbinding,
and do not support any such nexus requirement, however. In Quad/Tech,

21. Id.
22. Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK, 2011 WL 7036077,
at *39 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2011).
23. Id. at *20.
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there was no showing of infringement, so nexus was not in issue.24 The
quoted statement in i4i was speaking about loss of market share “as a
result of the infringing Word products,” not the infringing XML feature.25
Perfect 10 was a copyright case where there was no evidence that the
lost revenues had anything to do with Google’s alleged infringement of
Perfect 10’s images.26 Lastly, z4 Technologies involved a finding of no
irreparable harm primarily because “Microsoft’s continued infringement
does not inhibit z4’s ability to market, sell, or license its patented
technology to other entities in the market.”27 The denial of an injunction
hinged on z4’s inability to prove lost sales of the infringing software
functionality. Specifically, the court found that “Microsoft does not
produce product activation software that it then individually sells,
distributes, or licenses to other software manufacturers or consumers. If
it did, then z4 might suffer irreparable harm in that Microsoft would be
excluding z4 from selling or licensing its technology to those software
manufacturers or consumers.”28 Thus, when the court noted that “Microsoft
only uses the infringing technology as a small component of its own
software, and it is not likely that any consumer of Microsoft’s Windows
or Office software purchases these products for their product activation
functionality,” it was merely observing one reason why z4 failed to show
lost sales, not imposing any sort of nexus requirement.29
Judge Koh thus seems to have cut the nexus requirement from whole
cloth or at least made some very liberal inferences when reading the case
law. To have said that Apple “must” establish a nexus to prove irreparable
harm clearly started down a new path of injunction jurisprudence.
B. Federal Circuit Proceedings
On appeal, the Federal Circuit endorsed the district court’s requirement of
a nexus between the alleged infringement and loss of market share,
holding that
24. See Quad/Tech, Inc. v. Q.I. Press Controls B.V., 701 F. Supp. 2d 644, 656–57
(E.D. Pa. 2010), aff’d 413 F. App’x 278 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Quad/Tech’s non-use of the
patent is an important consideration against a finding of irreparable harm.”).
25. i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 861 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(emphasis added).
26. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 653 F.3d 976, 981–82 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining
that “search engines other than Google contribute to making Perfect 10 images freely
available” and that “notwithstanding Perfect 10’s theory of irreparable harm, it failed to
submit a statement from even a single former subscriber who ceased paying for Perfect
10’s service because of the content freely available via Google”).
27. z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 440 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
28. Id.
29. Id.
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[t]o show irreparable harm, it is necessary to show that the infringement caused
harm in the first place. Sales lost to an infringing product cannot irreparably harm a
patentee if consumers buy that product for reasons other than the patented
feature. If the patented feature does not drive the demand for the product, sales
would be lost even if the offending feature were absent from the accused product.
Thus, a likelihood of irreparable harm cannot be shown if sales would be lost
regardless of the infringing conduct.30

Ultimately, the Federal Circuit found that the nexus requirement was not
met with respect to the ’667 or ’08731 (iPhone) patents, finding no abuse of
discretion by the district court because substantial evidence was presented
on both sides of the issue.32 The Federal Circuit deemed the nexus
requirement satisfied with respect to the ’88933 (iPad) patent, emphasizing
the district court’s finding that design was more important to tablet
purchasers than smartphone purchasers and also the fact that “the tablet
market appeared to be dominated by only two manufacturers, Apple and
Samsung, who together controlled a substantial share of the market.”34
As to the bounce-back utility patent—the only utility patent at issue in
the appeal—the Federal Circuit summarily affirmed the district court’s
conclusion that the evidence was inadequate to prove “that consumer
purchasing decisions were based on the presence of the bounce-back
feature.”35
1. The Federal Circuit’s Basis for the Nexus Requirement
The Federal Circuit in Apple I justified its endorsement of the district
court’s nexus requirement as follows:
[A] likelihood of irreparable harm cannot be shown if sales would be lost
regardless of the infringing conduct. See Voda v. Cordis Corp., 536 F.3d 1311,
1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (explaining that “the district court did not clearly err in
finding that [the plaintiff] failed to show that [the defendant’s] infringement
caused him irreparable injury” (emphasis in original)); Procter & Gamble Co. v.
Ultreo, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 339, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (in trademark context,
30. Apple I, 678 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (emphasis added).
31. The Apple I court reached the irreparable harm analysis with respect to the
’087 patent because it reversed the district court’s finding that this patent was likely
anticipated. Id. at 1327.
32. Id. at 1324 & n.3, 1327.
33. The Apple I court reached the irreparable harm analysis with respect to the ’889
patent because it reversed the district court’s finding that this patent was likely obvious.
Id. at 1332.
34. Id. at 1321, 1328.
35. Id. at 1327.
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finding no “nexus between allegedly false advertising and lost sales” and
concluding that “[s]uch a loss, absent a nexus or a logical connection to false
advertising, is insufficient to demonstrate the irreparable harm required to issue
a preliminary injunction”).
....
A mere showing that Apple might lose some insubstantial market share as a
result of Samsung’s infringement is not enough. As the Supreme Court has pointed
out, a party seeking injunctive relief must make “a clear showing” that it is at
risk of irreparable harm, Winter, 555 U.S. at 22, 129 S. Ct. 365, which entails
showing “a likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury,” O’Shea
v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502, 94 S. Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974). See
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311, 102 S. Ct. 1798, 72 L.Ed.2d
91 (1982) (holding that an injunction should not issue as a matter of course for
irreparable harm that is “merely trifling”). Given our deferential standard of
review, we are not prepared to overturn the district court’s finding that Apple
failed to satisfy its burden of establishing the likelihood of irreparable harm.36

As with the district court, the authority cited by the Federal Circuit is
inapposite and nonbinding on the nexus issue. Voda involved a denial of
an injunction because the plaintiff could show only that the infringement
caused harm “to his exclusive licensee, rather than himself.”37 Thus,
“[the plaintiff] failed to show that [the defendant’s] infringement caused
him irreparable injury.”38 Whether the infringement was the cause of the
harm was not at issue. Procter & Gamble was a district court trademark
case.39 Finally, the Supreme Court cases cited simply stand for the
proposition that one must show clear entitlement to injunctive relief with
Strong evidence of irreparable harm. Thus, the Federal Circuit’s endorsement
of the nexus requirement simply follows the new path blazed by Judge
Koh.
2. Policy Concerns Behind the Federal Circuit Decision:
Judge Bryson’s Hypothetical Questioning
During Oral Argument
Judge Bryson, the author of the Apple I opinion, questioned the parties’
counsel during oral argument with his oft-utilized hypothetical scenarios.40
Specifically, Judge Bryson asked Apple’s counsel,

36. Id. at 1324–25.
37. Voda v. Cordis Corp., 536 F.3d 1311, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
38. Id.
39. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Ultreo, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 339, 349–50 (S.D.N.Y.
2008).
40. Oral Argument, Apple I, 678 F.3d 1314 (No. 2012-1105), available at http://
oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2012-1105.mp3.
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Suppose that Chrysler really likes the spiffy design of Ford’s cup holders in the
back seat of their Focus and they copy them. Blatantly copy them. Let’s
say . . . no consumer buys a Chrysler because those cup holder designs really
are nifty. You wouldn’t enter an injunction under those circumstances, would
you?
....
[Y]ou can say that any sales that were lost carry with them all sorts of additional
losses that are incalculable—market share, loyalty, dilution, those kinds of
things—that are really difficult to calculate. And that would be irreparable
harm if there were any sales that were lost, but since there weren’t any [in my
hypothetical] then it seems to me very hard to say that is irreparable harm
within the meaning of the four-part test for injunctions.
....
If you say the accused product is the whole Chrysler, there may have been
purchases . . . because Chrysler has neat ads or because they have a new engine.
That does not seem to me to be irreparable harm of the sort that we’re really
focused on, which is irreparable harm from the act of infringement. You’re saying
as long as the product which incorporates the infringing feature is taking sales
away from, in this case Ford, that’s enough. Can that possibly be right?41

Although Apple’s counsel attempted to shift the focus of Judge Bryson’s
hypothetical to the “balance of the hardships” and “public interest” factors,
Judge Bryson insisted that the force of his analogy went to the irreparable
harm prong of the injunction analysis.42 Thus, in Judge Bryson’s mind,
the issue seemed to be not whether it is fair or equitable to the parties or
the public to enjoin the sale of an entire car over a patent covering a cup
holder but whether the sale of the car can be deemed to irreparably harm
the patent holder’s market share absent proof that the infringing feature
was the reason for the sale of the infringing car.
III. APPLE II: SOLIDIFYING AND CLARIFYING THE
NEXUS REQUIREMENT
A few months after the Federal Circuit’s decision in Apple I, the court
had another opportunity to reconsider the nexus requirement. In Apple
II, Apple separately asserted against Samsung U.S. Patent No. 8,086,604,
which covers a unified search software feature, and sought to

41.
42.

Id. at 15:00–18:35.
Id. at 15:53–17:08.
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preliminarily enjoin Samsung’s manufacture and sale of the Samsung
Galaxy Nexus product.43
Apple’s alleged evidence of nexus was largely based on the popular
“Siri” search application in Apple’s iPhones, which depends in part on
the patented unified search features. 44 Thus, Apple contended that
“consumers must be at least in part attracted to the Galaxy Nexus because it
too incorporates the unified search feature” of Apple’s patent.45 The
district court had found this reasoning persuasive of nexus because the
patented unified search functionality was “core to Siri’s functionality”
and “a but-for driver of demand.”46 In reaching its conclusion, the district
court held that “the requisite causal nexus can be established by showing
either that the patented feature is an affirmative driver of consumer demand,
or that its absence would suppress consumer demand.”47 The district court
also adopted Apple’s argument “that a causal nexus may be established
by showing that removing the patented features will diminish the value
or substantially interfere with the functionality of the accused device.”48
On this basis, the district court entered a preliminary injunction against
Samsung.49
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed the nexus requirement,
confirming that
the causal nexus inquiry is indeed part of the irreparable harm calculus: it informs
whether the patentee’s allegations of irreparable harm are pertinent to the injunctive
relief analysis, or whether the patentee seeks to leverage its patent for competitive
gain beyond that which the inventive contribution and value of the patent
warrant.50

Thus, “[t]he patentee must . . . show that the infringing feature drives
demand for the accused product.”51
However, the Federal Circuit rejected the district court’s notion that
nexus could be established by showing that the absence of the patented
feature somehow diminished demand for or value of the infringing

43. Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co. (Apple II), 695 F.3d 1370, 1372–73 (Fed.
Cir. 2012).
44. Id. at 1375.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1376 (quoting Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co, 877 F. Supp. 2d 838,
909 (N.D. Cal. 2012), rev’d, 695 F.3d 1370) (internal quotation marks omitted).
47. Id. at 1375 (quoting Apple, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 906) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
48. Id. (citing Apple, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 905–06).
49. Id. at 1373.
50. Id. at 1375.
51. Id. (citing Apple I, 678 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
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product and reversed the entry of a preliminary injunction as a result.52
Taking issue with the district court’s characterization of the law, the
Federal Circuit clarified that
[t]he causal nexus requirement is not satisfied simply because removing an allegedly
infringing component would leave a particular feature, application, or device
less valued or inoperable. A laptop computer, for example, will not work (or
work long enough) without a battery, cooling fan, or even the screws that may hold
its frame together, and its value would be accordingly depreciated should those
components be removed. That does not mean, however, that every such component
is “core” to the operation of the machine, let alone that each component is the
driver of consumer demand. To establish a sufficiently strong causal nexus, Apple
must show that consumers buy the Galaxy Nexus because it is equipped with
the apparatus claimed in the ’604 patent—not because it can search in general,
and not even because it has unified search.53

Following Apple II, two things were abundantly clear. First, the causal
nexus requirement was indeed a “requirement” that “must” be satisfied
for an injunction to be ordered.54 Second, it was clear that the patentee
must affirmatively prove the patent drives demand for the infringing sale
to satisfy the nexus requirement. Proving that the absence of a feature
decreases demand does not suffice—the evidence must affirmatively show
that the patented feature is the reason that customers buy the infringing
product.
IV. HOW THE NEXUS REQUIREMENT ECHOES THE ENTIRE
MARKET VALUE RULE
Whether intentionally, subconsciously, or coincidentally, the nexus
requirement of Apple I and Apple II borrows concepts and language from
the Federal Circuit’s analogous jurisprudence pertaining to damages. By
using loaded phrases such as “drive the demand for the product,” the
Federal Circuit has invoked its so-called entire market value rule precedent
and opened the door for accused infringers to avoid injunctions in many
cases that involve complex and multicomponent technology. This Part
will explain the origin and framework of the entire market value rule,
provide some examples of how the rule is applied, and juxtapose the
entire market value rule’s analysis and policy justifications with those of
the nexus requirement. Although the district court and the Federal
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 1376.
Id. (emphasis added).
See id.
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Circuit have provided some citations to legal authority purporting to
support the application of a nexus requirement for injunctions, this
Article will show that the best and most correct source for the nexus
requirement comes from the Federal Circuit’s entire market value rule
case law. Indeed, both damages and injunctive relief are ways to
compensate a patentee for the harm caused by the infringement, and both
areas of the law share similar concerns about how the harm should be
appropriately remedied when the scope of the patented invention is small
compared with the accused product.
A. The Entire Market Value Rule
Patent owners are entitled to compensatory damages upon a finding of
infringement, with a “reasonable royalty” being the minimum damages
to which a patentee is entitled.55 Where complex or multicomponent
products are involved, it can be difficult to ascertain how large the royalty
should be. This is because the particular magnitude and value of the
contribution of a single component or feature within the grand scheme of
a larger product can be obscured. There is a risk in such situations that a
royalty calculated based on the entire product, for example, five percent
of all sales revenues, would overvalue the patented feature’s contribution
and therefore overcompensate the patentee. The entire market value rule
guards against such overcompensation by ensuring that where a patent
covers only one component or feature of a larger product, damages awarded
for infringement do not reach beyond the scope of the patented component
or feature.
This rule traces back to the Supreme Court’s decision in Garretson v.
Clark, in which the Court noted the challenges and risks of basing damages
on the entire market value of a product:
When a patent is for an improvement, and not for an entirely new machine or
contrivance, the patentee must show in what particulars his improvement has
added to the usefulness of the machine or contrivance. He must separate its
results distinctly from those of the other parts, so that the benefits derived from
it may be distinctly seen and appreciated. “The patentee” . . . “must in every
case give evidence tending to separate or apportion the defendant’s profits and
the patentee’s damages between the patented feature and the unpatented features,
and such evidence must be reliable and tangible, and not conjectural or speculative;
or he must show, by equally reliable and satisfactory evidence, that the profits
and damages are to be calculated on the whole machine, for the reason that the

55. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) (“Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award
the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less
than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with
interest and costs as fixed by the court.”).
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entire value of the whole machine, as a marketable article, is properly and
legally attributable to the patented feature.”56

In general, damages are to be calculated based on the “smallest salable
patent-practicing unit,” rather than the complete multicomponent product.57
For example, if the product accused of infringing is a laptop computer
and the patent covers a laptop battery, a royalty of ten percent per battery
is less likely to overcompensate the patentee because it is a fraction of
the value of the battery alone, whereas a royalty of two percent per laptop
carries a high risk of overcompensation because it is a fraction of the
value of the laptop, which includes many features and functions other
than its battery. Choosing the smaller component as the royalty base
removes a great deal of subjectivity from the analysis.
The entire market value rule is “a narrow exception to this general
rule.”58 If it can be shown that “the patented [feature] ‘was of such
paramount importance that it substantially created the value of the
component parts,’” a patentee may be awarded damages as a percentage
of revenues or profits attributable to the entire multicomponent product.59
In other words, the patented feature must be “the ‘basis for customer
demand’” for the product as a whole.60
In Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., the patent-in-suit was
directed to a visual “date-picker” feature found in the calendar functionality
of Microsoft’s Outlook e-mail program.61 The Federal Circuit began by
explaining that “[f]or the entire market value rule to apply, the patentee
must prove that ‘the patent-related feature is the basis for customer
demand.’”62 The court found that this case had a “lack of evidence
demonstrating the patented method . . . as the basis—or even a substantial
basis—of the consumer demand for Outlook.”63
56. 111 U.S. 120, 121 (1884).
57. LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 67 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (quoting Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 283, 287–88
(N.D.N.Y. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
58. Id.
59. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1549, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(quoting Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. v. United States, 53 U.S.P.Q. 246, 250 (Ct. Cl.
1942), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 320 U.S. 1 (1943)).
60. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(quoting Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1549).
61. Id. at 1317, 1337–38.
62. Id. at 1336 (quoting Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1549).
63. Id. at 1337.
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[T]he only reasonable conclusion supported by the evidence is that the infringing
use of the date-picker tool in Outlook is but a very small component of a much
larger software program. The vast majority of the features, when used, do not
infringe. The date-picker tool’s minor role in the overall program is further
confirmed when one considers the relative importance of certain other features,
e.g., e-mail. Consistent with this description of Outlook, Lucent did not carry
its evidentiary burden of proving that anyone purchased Outlook because of the
patented method. Indeed, Lucent’s damages expert conceded that there was no
“evidence that anybody anywhere at any time ever bought Outlook, be it an
equipment manufacturer or an individual consumer, . . . because it had a date
picker.” J.A 07821-22. And when we consider the importance of the many
features not covered by the Day patent compared to the one infringing feature in
Outlook, we can only arrive at the unmistakable conclusion that the invention
described in claim 19 of the Day patent is not the reason consumers purchase
Outlook.64

In LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., the patent-in-suit was
directed to a function of an optical disc drive (ODD) that allowed the
drive to automatically distinguish between types of discs, for example,
CD versus DVD.65 The patent owner sought damages as a percentage of
the revenues from an entire infringing laptop computer, claiming that the
patented disc drive feature “provided an important and valuable function
that was present in all ODDs currently in use, and that the presence of
this function was a prerequisite for any laptop computer to be successful
in the marketplace.”66 The Federal Circuit held that the patentee could
not claim damages as a percentage of each laptop computer because it
failed to show that the patented ODD functionality “drove demand for
the laptop computers.”67 The court emphasized that
[i]t is not enough to merely show that the disc discrimination method is viewed
as valuable, important, or even essential to the use of the laptop computer. Nor
is it enough to show that a laptop computer without an ODD practicing the disc
discrimination method would be commercially unviable. Were this sufficient, a
plethora of features of a laptop computer could be deemed to drive demand for
the entire product. To name a few, a high resolution screen, responsive keyboard,
fast wireless network receiver, and extended-life battery are all in a sense
important or essential features to a laptop computer; take away one of these
features and consumers are unlikely to select such a laptop computer in the
marketplace. But proof that consumers would not want a laptop computer
without such features is not tantamount to proof that any one of those features
alone drives the market for laptop computers. Put another way, if given a
choice between two otherwise equivalent laptop computers, only one of which
practices optical disc discrimination, proof that consumers would choose the
laptop computer having the disc discrimination functionality says nothing as to

64.
65.
2012).
66.
67.
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Id. at 1337–38 (emphasis added).
LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 56–57 (Fed. Cir.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 68.
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whether the presence of that functionality is what motivates consumers to buy a
laptop computer in the first place. It is this latter and higher degree of proof that
must exist to support an entire market value rule theory.68

As shown by the above summaries of Lucent and LaserDynamics, a
plaintiff cannot invoke the entire market value rule without meeting an
exceedingly high burden of proof. Cases that would find the rule satisfied
are rare and must involve substantial evidence of consumer purchasing
behavior. The end results of LaserDynamics and Lucent should not be
surprising, though, because ordinarily sales of complex and multicomponent
products will not be attributable to any single consumer-motivating feature.
Rather than deny damages outright to the patentee in such situations,
however, the patentee is simply compelled to accept a lesser and more
appropriate valuation of the invention’s contribution to the accused
product.
B. The “Nexus” Between Injunctions and Damages
The close parallels between the nexus requirement for injunctions and
the entire market value rule for damages are readily apparent. Both
analytical frameworks require the patentee to prove that the patented
feature “drives demand for the entire product”69 or “drives consumer
demand for the accused product.”70
Indeed, both LaserDynamics and Apple II clarified the respective
frameworks in the same way by requiring affirmative proof of nexus, not
negative proof concerning the effects of the absence of a feature.
LaserDynamics held that it is insufficient “to show that a laptop
computer without an ODD practicing the disc discrimination method
would be commercially unviable” and went on to explain that laptops
contain many essential components such as batteries that are necessary
for commercial viability but that this does not mean that battery “is what
motivates consumers to buy a laptop computer in the first place.”71
Likewise, Apple II held that “[t]he causal nexus requirement is not satisfied
simply because removing an allegedly infringing component would
leave a particular feature, application, or device less valued or inoperable”
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 67.
70. Apple II, 695 F.3d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Apple I, 678 F.3d 1314,
1324 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
71. LaserDynamics, 694 F.3d at 68.
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and noted that even though a laptop computer will not work without, for
example, a battery, “[t]hat does not mean, however, that every such
component is ‘core’ to the operation of the machine, let alone that each
component is the driver of consumer demand.”72
Oddly, despite the causal nexus and entire market value rule
frameworks being nearly identical, neither Apple I nor Apple II cited a
single entire market value rule case when announcing and refining the
nexus requirement. It is unclear whether the absence of any cross-citation
to the entire market value rule precedent is intentional, but the virtual
identity between the frameworks suggests that the Federal Circuit was at
least cognizant of the closely analogous precedent.
V. POST-APPLE I AND APPLE II INJUNCTION RULINGS
This Part examines applications of the nexus requirement following
the Apple I and Apple II decisions. It shows that both district courts and
the Federal Circuit appear reluctant to rigidly apply the nexus requirement
where the equities otherwise indicate the presence of irreparable harm,
particularly where the infringement is committed by the patentee’s
competitor and there is a resulting loss of sales.
A. Brocade Completely Disregards Apple I and Apple II in
Entering a Permanent Injunction
The first district court case to apply the nexus requirement outside of
the Apple litigation was Brocade Communications Systems v. A10
Networks, Inc.73 Brocade’s patents-in-suit were directed to improvements
in load balancing functionality for computer servers.74 Ultimately, the
district court granted Brocade’s request for a permanent injunction against
A10’s accused products despite a total absence of any proof of nexus.75
The district court began by reciting the nexus requirement from Apple
I and Apple II but immediately questioned whether the nexus requirement
was appropriate in the permanent injunction context.76 It observed “a
curious absence of references to the causal nexus standard” in the Federal
Circuit’s most recent decisions regarding permanent injunctions77 and
noted that although the Federal Circuit had distinguished between
preliminary and permanent injunctive relief in a recent trademark case as
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
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Apple II, 695 F.3d at 1376.
See No. C 10-3428 PSG, 2013 WL 140039, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2013).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *8.
Id. at *2–3.
Id. at *3.
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having “different prerequisites and serv[ing] entirely different purposes,”78
“both the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have advised that the
standard for irreparable harm is the same for preliminary and permanent
injunctions.”79
Against this backdrop, the district court “confess[ed] to doubt that the
causal nexus as articulated in Apple II should be required for all irreparable
harms offered in support of a request for a permanent injunction.”80 The
district court specifically disagreed with Judge Bryson’s view that nexus
is a better inquiry for the “balance of hardships” and “public interest”
factors of the injunction analysis,81 saying, “Whatever its ultimate merit
where the particular irreparable harm claimed is a loss of sales, that strict
standard appears to move into the irreparable harm analysis a consideration
better suited for the equitable factors of balance of hardships and public
interest.”82
As to the merits of the case, the district court made clear at the outset
that Brocade “has not shown that its patented features drove demand for
either its sales or A10’s sales.”83 This is because
Brocade has not presented sufficient evidence to support its contention that its
loss of market share and sales was the result of A10’s infringement. Brocade
asserts that GSLB and HA were critical features for both the ServerIron and AX
products. But as A10 points out, Brocade does not hold the patents to GSLB or
HA; it owns only the patents to enhancements of those features.84

Thus, rather than dwell on the nexus issues, the district court emphasized
the Federal Circuit’s statements in Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon
Manufacturing Corp., that despite the post-eBay absence of a presumption
in favor of injunctive relief against infringers, courts should not “entirely

78. Id. (quoting Lermer Ger. GmbH v. Lermer Corp., 94 F.3d 1575, 1577 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court in Lermer had noted that
“[b]ecause of the exacting standards that a party must meet to obtain a preliminary
injunction, it frequently happens that a party is denied a preliminary injunction pending
the disposition of the lawsuit but ultimately prevails on the merits and is awarded a
permanent injunction as part of the final judgment in the case. The two instruments are
distinct forms of equitable relief that have different prerequisites and serve entirely
different purposes.” 94 F.3d at 1577.
79. Brocade, 2013 WL 140039, at *3.
80. Id.
81. Id.; supra Part II.B.2.
82. Brocade, 2013 WL 140039, at *3.
83. Id. at *3 n.26.
84. Id.
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ignore the fundamental nature of patents as property rights granting the
owner the right to exclude.”85
The district court favorably cited and quoted post-Apple I and Apple II
permanent injunction decisions for the propositions that (1) because “a
patentee’s right to exclude is a fundamental tenet of patent law . . . absent
adverse equitable considerations, the winner of a judgment of validity
and infringement may normally expect to regain the exclusivity that was
lost with the infringement”86 and (2) “the axiomatic remedy for trespass
on property rights is removal of the trespasser,” and thus courts “should
be guided by the ‘historical practice of protecting the right to exclude
through injunctive relief given the difficulties of protecting this right
solely with monetary relief.’”87
Having decided to rely on such statements to the exclusion of the Apple I
and Apple II decisions, the district court proceeded to emphasize the
following facts that justified its ultimate finding of irreparable harm:
(1) “Brocade has demonstrated that A10’s infringement prevents it from
practicing its patents exclusively”; (2) “Neither party has presented any
evidence that Brocade licenses any of the technology in the patents to any
other parties”; and (3) “Brocade also shows that it is in direct competition
with A10, such that its loss of exclusivity is particularly injurious.”88
The district court concluded, “In a situation such as this, where Brocade
has shown that it practices its patent, that A10 is its direct competitor,
and that Brocade does not license its patents, Brocade has shown that it
suffers the type of irreparable harm that a permanent injunction is
intended to remedy.”89 On its face, this analysis entirely fails to consider
or apply the nexus requirement set forth in Apple I and Apple II.
B. LifeScan Draws a Line Between Inventions that Are Single
Features of Complex Products and Inventions that
Are a “Substantial Part” of a Product
In LifeScan, Inc. v. Shasta Technologies, LLC, the Northern District of
California entered a preliminary injunction in a manner that was highly
dismissive of the nexus test as expressed by Apple II.90 The patented

85. Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
86. Brocade, 2013 WL 140039, at *3 (quoting Edwards Lifesciences AG v. Core
Value, Inc., 699 F.3d 1305, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
87. Id. (quoting Presidio Components, Inc. v. Am. Technical Ceramics Corp., 702
F. 3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
88. Id. at *4.
89. Id.
90. See 933 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1245, 1261 (N.D. Cal. 2013), rev’d and remanded,
734 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (holding that as to the likelihood of success on the merits
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technology at issue in the case was directed to glucose monitoring
systems for individuals with diabetes and in particular to improved test
strips that more reliably gather blood samples to increase the accuracy of
testing.91 The patentee and accused infringers were direct competitors in
the testing strip market.92
In evaluating irreparable harm, the district court emphasized the fact
that the parties were in direct competition and noted that the accused
infringers did not seriously dispute that their sales of the accused testing
strips caused price erosion and lost sales that would decrease the patentee’s
market share.93 The accused infringers made a primary argument based
on Apple II—the patentee failed to show any causal nexus that the patented
feature of the testing strips was the reason consumers were purchasing
the accused products and causing the supposed harm.94
The district court took a highly dismissive view of the nexus-based
argument, stating that it was “not persuaded” because
[u]nlike a smartphone, which contains a myriad of features, test strips designed
for use in the OneTouch Ultra meter embody a substantial part of the patented
feature and not much else. That Plaintiffs have become the market leader suggests
that they possess a superior technology, the technology of the ’105 patent.95

Thus, the district court deemed the evidence of price erosion and lost sales
sufficient to demonstrate irreparable harm.96
Doctrinally, the district court in LifeScan oversimplified the causal
nexus analysis by focusing exclusively on the technological considerations.
Although it may be true that an invention that is only one part of a
product having a “myriad of features” is less likely to satisfy the nexus
test as compared with an invention that is a “substantial part” of the product,
as articulated by Apple I and Apple II, the inquiry must go further and
ask more generally whether “consumers buy that product for reasons other
than the patented feature.”97 Neither Apple I nor Apple II limited such

prong for preliminary injunctions, LifeScan’s patent rights were exhausted by free
distributions of the patented product).
91. Id. at 1245–46.
92. Id. at 1245.
93. Id. at 1261
94. Id. at 1262.
95. Id. (emphasis added).
96. See id.
97. Id. (quoting Apple II, 695 F.3d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2012)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).

175

“reasons” to technological ones. At least one court has subsequently
applied this more literal reading of the nexus test to include considerations
of impulse purchase marketing and price in finding a lack of nexus.98 If
consumers purchased the accused products because of better branding or
marketing, lower pricing, or even the color or aesthetic configuration of
the accused testing strips, then the nexus test may be unsatisfied even if
the patented technology comprises the vast majority of how the accused
testing strip works.
It may be true the patentee in LifeScan became the market leader for
testing strips because of its patented technology, but that fails to
acknowledge that there may be many different reasons that consumers
chose to purchase the defendants’ products. Consumers may or may not
even care how the testing strip works as long as it works. Absent any
such evidence or analysis by the district court, the preliminary injunction
entered in LifeScan is not on firm ground under Apple I and Apple II.
Moreover, the nexus test does not depend on the manner in which the
invention is claimed—whether the claims are drafted to cover the entire
product or a component or portion thereof. Such a distinction leads to
drafting gamesmanship and the potential search for the “point of novelty” or
the “real invention” in a claim that is drafted to cover a whole product.
The nexus test merely asks whether the harm to the patentee is caused by
the infringement or something else.
C. Douglas Dynamics Reverses a Denial of a Permanent Injunction
with No Reference to Apple I or Apple II
In Douglas Dynamics, LLC v. Buyers Products Co., the patent owner
Douglas Dynamics (Douglas) sued its competitor Buyers Products (Buyers)
for alleged infringement of its patented snowplow blade technology.99
Despite a finding of validity and infringement at trial, the district court
denied Douglas’s request for a permanent injunction based essentially on
the finding that Buyers does not “directly compete” with Douglas.100 More
specifically, the district court found a lack of irreparable harm because
“Douglas failed to show it was losing sales or market share to Buyers.”101
This conclusion was based on the facts that (1) Douglas and Buyers
98. See Am. Beverage Corp. v. Diageo N. Am., Inc., 936 F. Supp. 2d 555, 616 (W.D.
Pa. 2013) (denying patentee’s request for a preliminary injunction as to its frozen beverage
pouches in part because the patentee failed to show nexus and in fact argued against
nexus by claiming that “frozen RTD pouches are impulse purchases made predominantly
based upon price and ‘appetite appeal,’ not the pouch shape”).
99. 717 F.3d 1336, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
100. Id. at 1343.
101. Id. at 1344.
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apparently targeted different consumers within the same snowplow
market—Douglas sold higher-end products than Buyers—and (2) Douglas’s
market share increased by one percent a year after Buyers began selling
the infringing snowplows.102
The Federal Circuit reversed with a forceful opinion, authored by
Chief Judge Rader, that went on for pages about the breadth of ways that
a patentee can show irreparable harm from a competitor. At the outset,
Chief Judge Rader made clear that “[s]imply because a patentee
manages to maintain a profit in the face of infringing competition does
not automatically rebut a case for irreparable injury. Irreparable injury
encompasses different types of losses that are often difficult to quantify,
including lost sales and erosion in reputation and brand distinction.”103
As to the argument that Douglas and Buyers targeted different market
segments, the court made an analogy to Mercedes and Ford automobiles:
Here, the district court likened Douglas’s snowplow to a Mercedes Benz S550
and Buyers’s snowplow to a Ford Taurus. Indeed, buyers interested in purchasing
the Mercedes, when presented with both choices, would not likely switch to the
Ford and vice versa. However, if the Ford made its place in the market by
infringing on the intellectual property of the Mercedes and capitalized on its
similarity to the better product, then the harm to the Mercedes product might go
beyond a simple counting of lost sales—some of which would occur anyway if
the Ford marketed itself effectively as a “Mercedes at half the price.” The Mercedes
would lose some of its distinctiveness and market lure because competitors
could contend that they had “similar features” without noting that those features
infringe Mercedes’s proprietary technologies.104

As to Douglas’s one percent increase in market share, the Federal Circuit
viewed this fact as “immaterial” because market share can be gained for
many reasons, such as reputation and investment in marketing, sales, and
engineering.105 Additionally, the Federal Circuit found that Douglas’s
reputation as an innovator was harmed despite the absence of evidence
that interested consumers confused the two companies: “Douglas’s
reputation as an innovator will certainly be damaged if customers found
the same ‘innovations’ appearing in competitors’ snowplows, particularly
products considered less expensive and innovative.”106

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 1344–45.
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Surprisingly, neither Apple I nor Apple II is cited anywhere in the
Douglas Dynamics opinion. Whether nexus was presumed or not raised
by the parties, one would have expected the court at least to acknowledge
the nexus requirement. Instead, Chief Judge Rader summarized his view
of the case with an almost pre-eBay presumptive sentiment: “Where two
companies are in competition against one another, the patentee suffers
the harm—often irreparable—of being forced to compete against products
that incorporate and infringe its own patented inventions.”107 Clearly, at
least Chief Judge Rader feels strongly that competitive harm is an important
and broadly construed factor in the injunction analysis.
Perhaps Chief Judge Rader’s ignoring the Apple decisions stems from
the Supreme Court’s statement in eBay that rules, classifications, or
“expansive principles” that might prevent injunctive relief from issuing
“in a broad swath of cases” are impermissible under traditional equitable
analysis.108 As he was not on either the Apple I or Apple II panels—and
thus has not before spoken on the nexus test—he may feel that these
cases are in direct conflict with eBay and should not be followed.
VI. APPLE III: PERMANENT INJUNCTION PROCEEDINGS
This Part explores the application of Apple I and Apple II in the
permanent injunction context after trial and how Apple’s motion for a
permanent injunction was denied. It also follows the course of Apple’s
third appeal to the Federal Circuit to obtain injunctive relief against
Samsung and offers some discussion as to the potential ultimate resolution
of the nexus issue.
A. District Court Proceedings
On remand, Apple prevailed at trial in proving infringement of all of
the design patents discussed above, as well as Apple’s utility patents
directed to the “bounce back,” “pinch to zoom,” and “double-tap to zoom”
features.109 Apple secured a $1.05 billion jury verdict against Samsung
for its infringement.110 Apple subsequently moved the district court for
107. Id. at 1345.
108. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 393 (2006).
109. See Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 926 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1103 (N.D. Cal.
2013) (stating that “a jury found that a range of Samsung products infringe several of
Apple’s design and utility patents”).
110. Samsung later moved for and was granted a new trial on damages because the
jury failed to correctly follow the law as to when Samsung’s profits could be awarded to
Apple under 35 U.S.C. § 289 and as to when Samsung was first on notice of Apple’s
patents pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 287(a). See id. at 1112 (ordering a new trial on damages
for the Galaxy Prevail product).
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a permanent injunction against Samsung’s infringing products.111 The
motion was ultimately denied, but in rejecting essentially all of Apple’s
evidence offered to show nexus, the district court provided detailed reasons
for Apple’s failure of proof, attempting to provide guidance as to how
one might make the requisite showing.
The district court began by citing and explaining the nexus standard as
set forth in Apple I and Apple II.112 It then acknowledged that the prior
appeals involved preliminary injunctions but held that the framework
should not change for permanent injunction proceedings. The district court
reasoned, briefly and in a footnote, that “the irreparable harm requirement
applies to both preliminary and permanent injunctions, and there is nothing
in the Apple II opinion suggesting that its discussion of irreparable harm
should be limited to the preliminary injunction context. Indeed, Courts
regularly cite cases from the two contexts interchangeably.”113
In reviewing all of the evidence presented at trial and weighing all of
the eBay factors, the district court denied Apple’s request for a permanent
injunction across the board.114 The crux of the district court’s denial was
Apple’s alleged failure of proof of nexus—Apple did not show that it lost
sales “because Samsung infringed Apple’s patents.”115 Unfortunately, as
explained in detail below, the district court explained why Apple’s evidence
was not sufficient but provided little meaningful guidance as to what
evidence would have sufficed.
The district court analyzed nexus on a patent-by-patent basis, rejecting
Apple’s argument that the combined harm of all the infringement by
each product justified an injunction.116 Additionally, the district court
focused closely on the particularly claimed features covered by Apple’s
patents, rejecting Apple’s evidence that spoke to the features at a higher
level of generality.117 Although Apple presented considerable evidence
that design is important to consumer choice,

111. Apple III Dist., 909 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1149 (N.D. Cal. 2012), rev’d, 727 F.3d
1214 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
112. Id. at 1150.
113. Id. at 1150 n.2.
114. Id. at 1163.
115. Id. (“The fact that Apple may have lost customers and downstream sales to
Samsung is not enough to justify an injunction. Apple must have lost these sales because
Samsung infringed Apple’s patents. Apple has simply not been able to make this showing.”).
116. Id. at 1153.
117. Id. at 1154–55.
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even if design was clearly a driving factor, it would not establish the required
nexus. [Because t]he design of the phones includes elements of all three design
patents, as well as a whole host of unprotectable, unpatented features. Apple
makes no attempt to prove that any more specific element of the iPhone’s
design, let alone one covered by one of Apple’s design patents, actually drives
consumer demand.118

Similarly, the district court rejected Apple’s consumer survey evidence
and industry praise that referred to and commended certain design
characteristics of Apple’s and Samsung’s phones. 119 Although this
evidence was more specific than “general ‘design’ allegations,” it still
failed to identify the patented designs and features in particular—“Apple
does not have a patent on, for example, glossiness, or on black color.”120
Moreover, “[o]ne consumer mentioning a feature in a survey says very
little about what drives consumer demand generally, and one journalist’s
description of features proves nothing beyond that individual’s
preferences.”121
Apple’s evidence as to its utility patents was similarly rejected for being
too general. Apple introduced evidence that “ease of use” was important
to consumers, but the fact that “[a] consumer may want a phone that is
easy to use . . . does not establish that a tap-to-zoom feature, for example, or
any given type of gesture, is a driver of consumer demand.”122 Apple
introduced a report from a consulting firm “identifying features that
Apple customers like about their phones, including individual consumers’
observations that you ‘can enlarge pictures and move them around’ and
use ‘gestures like a two finger pinch and flick.’”123 The district court
rejected this evidence as nonprobative because the
quotations do not identify features at a level of specificity sufficient to determine
whether they are actually covered by Apple’s patents. Apple does not have a
patent on enlarging pictures and moving them around, but rather on a specific
way of enlarging pictures. Nor does Apple have a patent on the general concept
of a two-finger pinch or flick.124

In any event, “evidence of what Apple customers like about their phones
does not establish that any consumers bought Samsung phones because

118. Id. at 1154 (“The Federal Circuit made clear in Apple II that customer demand for
a general feature of the type covered by a patent was not sufficient; Apple must instead
show that consumers buy the infringing product specifically because it is equipped with
the patented feature.” (citing Apple II, 695 F.3d 1370, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2012))).
119. Id. at 1155.
120. Id. at 1154.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1155.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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of these same features.”125 Similarly, the court rejected Apple’s proof
that Samsung intentionally copied some of Apple’s patented features
because it proved only “what Samsung thought would attract purchasers,
not what actually attracted purchasers.”126
Finally, a survey conducted by Apple’s expert asked consumers what
“price premium” over the base price of a Samsung phone consumers
would pay for various of Apple’s patented features.127 The court also
rejected this evidence because it “is not the same as evidence that
consumers will buy a Samsung phone instead of an Apple phone because it
contains that feature.”128 Measuring the willingness to pay for features,
not products, “does not address the relationship between demand for a
feature and demand for a complex product incorporating that feature and
many other features.”129
Thus, the district court concluded that Apple had not satisfied the nexus
requirement, and “[w]ithout a causal nexus, this Court cannot conclude
that the irreparable harm supports entry of an injunction.”130 The district
court did, however, make additional findings relating to irreparable harm
and the adequacy of money damages to compensate for the infringement.
Specifically, the district court found that (1) Apple and Samsung were
direct competitors that competed for first-time smartphone buyers;
(2) Apple had lost market share to Samsung; and (3) the initial loss of
sales to Samsung would have downstream effects, including lost future
sales of future phone models and related products such as apps, laptop
computers, and other accessories.131 The first two findings, according to
the district court, can “support a finding of irreparable harm” and “provide
some evidence that Apple may not be fully compensated by the damages
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1156.
127. Id.
128. Id. This is an inartful phrasing of the nexus requirement. The district court
should have more accurately required survey “evidence that consumers will buy a
Samsung phone instead of an Apple phone because it contains that feature.” The district
court’s statement conflated the separate requirements that Apple prove (1) it lost sales to
Samsung and (2) that the sales were lost because of the infringement. See Apple I, 678
F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Sales lost to an infringing product cannot irreparably
harm a patentee if consumers buy that produce for reasons other than the patented
feature. If the patented feature does not drive the demand for the product, sales would be
lost even if the offending feature were absent from the accused product.”).
129. Apple III Dist., 909 F. Supp. 2d at 1156.
130. Id. at at 1157.
131. Id. at 1152.
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award.” 132 As noted above, the district court ultimately found that
irreparable harm was lacking primarily due to Apple’s failure to satisfy
the nexus requirement. Regarding the adequacy of money damages, the
district court discounted Apple’s evidence because Apple had failed to
show that its patents were “priceless” or “off limits” to licensing.133
Specifically, the district court pointed to the fact that Apple had previously
offered Samsung licenses to its patents and that Apple had licensed the
utility patents asserted against Samsung to Nokia, IBM, and HTC.134
According to the district court,
[t]he fact that Apple is now expressing an unwillingness to license these properties
does not change the fact that Apple has, in the past, felt that money was a fair
trade for the right to practice its patents, and that Apple has in the past been
willing to extend license offers to Samsung.135

As to the balance of the hardships, the district court noted that Samsung
had voluntarily ceased manufacture of twenty-three accused products
and developed design-arounds for the remaining accused products.136
Thus, this factor was deemed “neutral.”137
Regarding whether an injunction would be in the public interest, the
district court noted that the large number of products Apple sought to
enjoin could result in an injunction having adverse effects on the public.138
While recognizing Apple’s argument that the protection of patent rights
is in the public interest, the district court also acknowledged Samsung’s
point that a broad injunction against many products could be “disruptive
to suppliers, retailers, and customers.”139 Because Samsung had voluntarily
removed twenty-six products from the market and claimed to have
developed design-arounds for the others, the district court viewed the
alleged disruption as being overstated because it would be “limited to
existing stock” and “would surely be brief.”140 The district court also
dismissed the notion that an injunction’s reduction in competition would
be harmful to consumers in general because “Apple and Samsung, despite
being direct competitors, are not the only suppliers of mobile phones in
the market, nor are Samsung’s infringing phones the only phones Samsung

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

182

See id. at 1152, 1160.
Id. at 1160.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1161.
Id. at 1161–62.
See id. at 1162.
Id.
Id.
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offers.”141 Nevertheless, the district court found that an injunction would
not be in the public interest because
[i]t would not be equitable to deprive consumers of Samsung’s infringing phones
when, as explained above, only limited features of the phones have been found
to infringe any of Apple’s intellectual property. Though the phones do contain
infringing features, they contain a far greater number of non-infringing features
to which consumers would no longer have access if this Court were to issue an
injunction. The public interest does not support removing phones from the market
when the infringing components constitute such limited parts of complex, multifeatured products.142

Notably, this reasoning effectively imports a variant of the nexus
requirement into the public interest analysis—a proposition that Judge
Bryson rejected, as discussed above. Essentially, the district court held
that when the significance of the patented features and functions within
the accused product is relatively small, it would be against the public
interest to enjoin the entire product.
In ultimately denying the permanent injunction, the district court again
focused on the irreparable harm prong and summarized its reasoning as
follows:
Weighing all of the factors, the Court concludes that the principles of equity do
not support the issuance of an injunction here. First and most importantly, Apple
has not been able to link the harms it has suffered to Samsung’s infringement of
any of Apple’s six utility and design patents that the jury found infringed by
Samsung products in this case. The fact that Apple may have lost customers and
downstream sales to Samsung is not enough to justify an injunction. Apple must
have lost these sales because Samsung infringed Apple’s patents. Apple has
simply not been able to make this showing. Though this is a case where the
“plaintiff practices its invention and is a direct market competitor,” [Edwards
Lifesciences AG v. CoreValve, Inc., 699 F.3d 1305, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2012)], it is not
a case where the patented inventions are central to the infringing product.
Without the required causal nexus, the parties’ status as direct competitors simply
does not justify an injunction.143

Finally, the district court deemed its decision justifiable and in accordance
with Justice Kennedy’s observation in eBay that “[w]hen the patented
invention is but a small component of the product . . . and the threat of
an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations,
legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement

141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id. at 1163.
Id. (emphasis added).
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and an injunction may not serve the public interest.”144 As to Apple in
particular, the district court reasoned that “[t]hough Apple does have
some interest in retaining certain features as exclusive to Apple, it does
not follow that entire products must be forever banned from the market
because they incorporate, among their myriad features, a few narrow
protected functions.”145
B. Apple’s Position on Appeal to the Federal Circuit
On appeal, Apple lodged three primary attacks on the district court’s
decision. First, Apple contested whether the nexus requirement was
appropriate at all in a permanent injunction context.146 Second, Apple
argued that the district court placed undue emphasis on the nexus
requirement to the exclusion of the remaining eBay factors and
considerations, which together weigh heavily in favor of a permanent
injunction.147 Third, Apple contended that even if the nexus standard
applied, it was improper for the district court to strictly consider the
evidence on a patent-by-patent basis and that in any event, Apple’s
evidence was sufficient to warrant a permanent injunction.148 Finally,
Apple suggested that even if the nexus test was applied correctly and
Apple failed to satisfy the test, injunctive relief should not be entirely
denied but should be appropriately tailored.149
1. The Propriety of a Nexus Requirement for Permanent Injunctions
Apple’s appeal brief emphasized that the district court cited Apple’s
alleged failure to prove nexus as the “first and most important” reason
for denying the permanent injunction.150 Yet, Apple correctly noted that
a nexus requirement had never been previously imposed in a permanent
injunction context and that neither Apple I nor Apple II purported to
extend beyond the preliminary injunction context before the Federal
Circuit in those cases. 151 Although Apple previously sought the
“extraordinary” relief of a preliminary injunction that alters the status quo
before any finding of wrongful conduct by Samsung had occurred, now
144. Id. (quoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 396–97 (2006)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
145. Id. at 1164.
146. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant Apple Inc. at 2–3, 27–29, Apple III, 735 F.3d
1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (No. 13-1129) [hereinafter, Apple III Appeal Brief].
147. Id. at 50.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 58–59.
150. Id. at 47 (internal quotation marks omitted).
151. See id.
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that Samsung is an adjudged infringer, Apple argued that the “right to
exclude” afforded to it with its patents was triggered and should be
meaningful.152 The nexus requirement was alleged to be simply too onerous
to satisfy in cases where “a single patent does not cover an entire product,
but only an innovative design or feature within a larger product”—to
deny injunctive relief for virtually all such patents effectively eviscerates
the patents’ exclusionary rights.153
According to Apple, particularly where the adjudged infringer is a direct
competitor of the patentee, as with Apple and Samsung, courts have
frequently granted permanent injunctive relief regardless of any causal
nexus.154 These results are appropriate in Apple’s view because, as was
noted by both Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Roberts in eBay, typical
patent litigation between competitors that results in a competitor being
found to infringe would more often than not result in a weighing of the
four equitable factors in favor of entering a permanent injunction.155
Apple reminded the Federal Circuit that eBay not only set forth the
exclusive four-factor test for permanent injunctive relief, which makes
no reference to “nexus,” but also cautioned that “a major departure from
the long tradition of equity practice should not be lightly implied.”156
The nexus requirement is undoubtedly a substantial and rigid requirement
as applied by the district court. Suggesting that the nexus requirement is
indeed a major departure from traditional injunction analysis, Apple cited
recent post-eBay Federal Circuit decisions supporting the entry of permanent
injunctions without any mention of a causal nexus requirement.157

152. Id. at 51, 52 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22, 24 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
153. Id. at 54.
154. Id. at 53–54 (citing Whitserve, LLC v. Computer Packages, Inc., 694 F.3d 10,
35 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1150–51
(Fed. Cir. 2011); i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 861 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
155. Id. at 48–49 (quoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395
(2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (explaining that “‘a page of history is worth a volume
of logic’ in reference to the historical practice of ‘granting injunctive relief upon a
finding of infringement in the vast majority of patent cases’”); id. at 396 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“To the extent earlier cases establish a pattern of granting an injunction against
patent infringers almost as a matter of course, this pattern simply illustrates the result of
the four-factor test in the contexts then prevalent.” (internal quotation marks omitted))).
156. Id. at 48 (quoting eBay, 547 U.S. at 391) (internal quotation marks omitted).
157. Id. at 49–50 (citing Robert Bosch LLC, 659 F.3d at 1152–55; Broadcom Corp.
v. Qualcomm Inc., 543 F.3d 683, 701–03 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp.,
551 F.3d 1323, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
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Yet, the district court denied Apple’s request for a permanent injunction
“[f]irst and most importantly” because of the alleged lack of nexus and
appeared to weigh the irreparable harm factor—actually one consideration
within the irreparable harm analysis—far more heavily than the other
factors. 158 The district court’s analysis appears inconsistent with its
statement that it had “[w]eigh[ed] all the factors” to arrive at its conclusion,
particularly because the district court expressly stated that “[w]ithout the
required causal nexus, the parties’ status as direct competitors simply does
not justify an injunction.”159 Such an apparently rigid rule conflicts with
eBay’s pronouncement that “categorical” denial of injunctive relief is the
kind of “analysis [that] cannot be squared with the principles of equity
adopted by Congress.”160
2. Analysis of the Four eBay Factors
Looking at all of the eBay factors and the relevant factual considerations,
Apple contended that it was an abuse of discretion not to enter a permanent
injunction against Samsung given the factual findings made by the district
court. As noted above, the district court found that Apple and Samsung
were direct competitors, that Apple had lost market share to Samsung,
and that this initial loss of sales to Samsung would have downstream effects
on sales and customer retention but found that the lack of nexus precluded a
finding of irreparable harm.
Apple sharply criticized the district court’s reliance on Apple’s supposed
willingness to license its patents as proof of the adequacy of money
damages. Apple pointed out that the licenses to Nokia, IBM, and HTC
were limited to utility patents and included none of Apple’s design
patents.161 Moreover, the district court failed to address the particular
circumstances of the licenses, in particular the fact that the license to
IBM was executed five years before the launch of the iPhone in 2007
and was “part of a broad cross-license with a company that does not sell
smartphones.”162 The Nokia and HTC agreements were litigation
settlements of limited value in assessing the business reasons for the
licenses but in any event were limited in scope and directed to preventing
“clones” of Apple products.163 According to Apple, these licenses are
consistent with Apple’s strong desire not to license its unique user
158. Apple III Dist., 909 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1163 (N.D. Cal. 2012), rev’d, 727 F.3d
1214 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
159. Id.
160. eBay, 547 U.S. at 393–94.
161. Apple III Appeal Brief, supra note 146, at 39.
162. Id. at 39–40.
163. Id. at 40–41.
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experience to direct competitors and to maintain such features and
functions exclusively.164 Furthermore, although the district court noted
that Apple had previously licensed “some [of its] patents” to Samsung,
Apple contended that no such offer was ever made for the patents-in-suit
because Apple viewed the patents-in-suit as “untouchables.”165
As to the balance of the hardships, Apple argued that Samsung’s
voluntary removal of accused products and supposed low-cost designarounds did not obviate the need for an injunction.166 Apple alleged,
Because Samsung frequently brings new products to market, an injunction is
essential to providing Apple the swift relief needed to combat any future
infringement by Samsung through products not more than colorably different
from those already found to infringe. Apple should not have to bear the risk
that Samsung’s supposed design-arounds are insufficient or that Samsung will
not again resume its infringement.167

Additionally, if Samsung indeed stopped selling twenty-six products
and could easily implement design-arounds for the remaining products,
then the hardship to Samsung would be minimal.168 Thus, Apple contends
that the balance of the hardships is not neutral but favors the entry of an
injunction.
Regarding the public interest, Apple emphasized the importance of
protecting patent rights, noting that “[t]he public interest in patent
enforcement is particularly strong where, as here, an injunction will not
implicate public safety issues, but will only prevent Samsung from unfairly
competing with Apple by selling products that use Apple’s patented designs
and features.”169 The recognized availability of other smartphones in the
marketplace undercut the notion of any substantial detriment to the public if
Samsung were to be enjoined.170 Apple also criticized the district court
for expressing reluctance to issue a “broad injunction” covering Samsung’s
more than twenty-six infringing products: “Samsung cannot avoid an
injunction simply because its infringement involved many products. To

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 41.
Id. at 38 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 41–42.
Id. at 42 (citation omitted).
See id.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 44–45.
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the contrary, the public’s interest would be served by ending such broadranging infringement.”171
3. Application of the Nexus Requirement
Even if the nexus requirement were proper in the permanent injunction
context, Apple argued on appeal that the district court’s insistence on
applying the test on a patent-by-patent basis was improper and not
required by Apple I or Apple II.172 Requiring each infringing feature to
independently drive demand for the accused products “would be difficult—
if not impossible—to show for products embodying multiple patented
features, where it is unlikely that a patentee could offer proof that each
patented feature independently drove demand.”173
Apple also took issue with the district court’s weighing of the evidence it
offered to prove nexus under the standard as applied by the district court.
Apple presented considerable and undisputed evidence at trial that
consumers find product design and user interface to be important influences
in their decisionmaking when buying smartphones and tablets.174 The
patented features, both design and utility, were argued to be “such large
components of the overall design and ease-of-use of Samsung’s infringing
smartphones that Apple’s undisputed evidence of the importance of those
features to consumers should have been more than sufficient to demonstrate
a causal nexus between Samsung’s infringement and the irreparable
harm Apple has suffered.”175 Apple vehemently disputed the district court’s
dismissal of its various third-party assessments and surveys regarding
the importance and value of the patented features.176 This third-party praise
and survey evidence touted the same “beautiful” and “cool” design features
in both Apple’s and Samsung’s products, making specific reference to
the general “sleek” and “rounded” overall design, as well as specific
portions covered by the design patents—the “shiny black face” that is
“rimmed by mirror-finish stainless steel.”177
As to the utility patents, third-party praise and consumer survey evidence
likewise showed that Apple’s “easy and intuitive” user interface “is the
major driver of [consumer] interest in touch” screens because it makes
the user interface “real magic” and “wicked cool” without being difficult
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
omitted).

188

Id. at 45.
Id. at 48–50.
Id. at 50.
See id. at 61.
Id. at 62.
See supra Part VI.A.
Apple III Appeal Brief, supra note 146, at 62–63 (internal quotation marks
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to use.178 More specifically, third-party praise and surveys touted the
individually patented functions, noting that the “two finger pinch” and
“bounce” functions make using the products “fun” and that the “double
tap” zooming is “the most preferred method” for such functionality.179
Overall, Apple rejected the district court’s insistence that this thirdparty praise and survey evidence were “simply too general” and failed to
clearly relate to the patented features.180
4. Appropriately Tailoring Injunctions when the Nexus
Requirement Is Not Satisfied
Apple suggested to the Federal Circuit that even if the nexus requirement
was applicable, correctly applied, and unsatisfied by Apple, Apple still
should not be denied injunctive relief entirely. Rather, Apple proposed a
more “flexible” approach, whereby an injunction could be issued but the
district court could use its equitable discretion to delay enforcement to
allow the defendant time to implement a design-around.181 Such “sunset
provision[s]” have been approved by the Federal Circuit in the past in
situations where it would have been “inequitable to require immediate
compliance” with an injunction.182
Importantly, in support of its flexible injunction approach, Apple
expressly relied on the Federal Circuit’s entire market value rule precedent
to draw a helpful analogy.183 Apple first made clear that the nexus
requirement is substantively identical to the entire market value rule:
This flexible approach to permanent injunctions is entirely consistent with the
closely-related relationship between the entire market value rule and reasonable
royalty damages. To recover a reasonable royalty based on the entire value of an
accused product, the patentee must show—as with the causal nexus requirement—
that the patent either claims the entire product or else a smaller feature that
drives demand for the entire product. See Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120,
121 (1884); Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1318 (Fed.
Cir. 2011); see also LaserDynamics, 694 F.3d at 67 (“[T]he entire market value
rule allows damages based on the value of an entire apparatus containing several

178. Id. at 64–65 (internal quotation marks omitted).
179. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
180. Id. at 66 (internal quotation marks omitted).
181. Id. at 57–59.
182. Id. at 57 (citing Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 543 F.3d 683, 704 (Fed.
Cir. 2008); Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d 1295, 1311 n.12
(Fed. Cir. 2007)).
183. See id. at 58.
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features, when the patented feature constitutes the basis for customer demand.”
(emphasis added) (quoting Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301,
1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009))).184

Apple went on to point out that in the damages context, failure to satisfy
the entire market value rule does not deprive the patentee of a remedy—
it merely limits the remedy that may be obtained:
But the failure to prove that the patented feature “drives demand” does not
mean that the patentee gets no damages at all; it simply means that the patentee
must apportion part of the entire product’s value to the patented feature, so that
the patentee does not recover more than the value of what has been invented.
Indeed, a patentee still can obtain a reasonable royalty without satisfying the entire
market value rule, which after all “is a narrow exception” to the general damages
rule. LaserDynamics, 694 F.3d at 67.185

Because neither the Federal Circuit nor the Supreme Court has ever
recognized the nexus requirement as a similar kind of “narrow exception”
when eBay’s four-factor test otherwise renders a permanent injunction
appropriate, Apple proffered that the “solution is to allow courts to exercise
their considerable discretion to sculpt injunctions so as to permit defendants
to implement design-arounds, which would—like the entire market value
rule—prevent the patentee from reaping a windfall without denying
relief entirely.”186
C. Potential Ways To Resolve the Nexus Issue
As explained above, Apple presented the Federal Circuit with several
avenues to decide the case. As noted below, however, a Federal Circuit
panel has decided the Apple III appeal but has done so in a manner
inconsistent with the prior Apple I and Apple II decisions, leaving the
Apple III decision of questionable precedential value and the nexus issue
ripe for en banc consideration. Thus, all of the arguments made by Apple
and those discussed below remain very much in play for future appeals
that challenge the nexus requirement. Given the importance of the issue
to nearly every patent litigation matter, sooner or later an en banc petition
on the nexus issue will garner sufficient attention at the Federal Circuit
to be granted and will attract a substantial amount of amicus support on
both sides.
If the Federal Circuit ultimately agrees with Apple that the nexus
requirement is inappropriate to import into the permanent injunction
context, then Apple will likely ultimately secure a permanent injunction
184.
185.
186.

190

Id.
Id. at 58–59.
Id. at 59.
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because the district court placed great weight on Apple’s failure to show
nexus and because the remaining considerations under eBay generally
favor the entry of an injunction under precedent such as Bosch.
In order to hold that no nexus requirement applies for permanent
injunctions, presumably the Federal Circuit would have to take an approach
similar to that in Brocade, discussed above. That is, the Federal Circuit
would likely pay lip service to Apple I and Apple II but highlight the
differences between preliminary and permanent injunctions and rely on
cases such as Bosch to emphasize the importance that a patent’s
exclusionary right be meaningful. As a matter of doctrinal clarity, it would
not be ideal to have such a distinction made without a well-defined
difference in how the irreparable harm factor is analyzed for preliminary
and permanent injunctions.
The nexus requirement, as applied in the preliminary injunction context,
would arguably not need to be revisited in Apple III unless the Federal
Circuit decided to hear the case en banc and reconsider—and potentially
overrule—Apple I and Apple II. Apple specifically requested in its appeal
brief that the appeal be heard en banc to the extent the Federal Circuit
believes that Apple I and Apple II prevent the court from granting Apple
the relief it seeks.187 Again, from a doctrinal clarity standpoint, to the extent
the Federal Circuit sees fit to modify or abrogate the nexus requirement,
treating all the Apple cases together would be the most sensible.
If, however, the nexus requirement is deemed applicable for only
permanent injunctions, or is deemed applicable in a modified form for
permanent injunctions, then the Federal Circuit will have several important
questions to resolve. Each will now be taken in turn.
1. When and How Does the Nexus Requirement Apply to
Permanent Injunctions?
First and foremost, the Federal Circuit will have to explain why it
never raised the nexus requirement in any of its permanent injunction
decisions post-eBay or even post-Apple I. Although the Federal Circuit
has been clear that the irreparable harm analysis does not significantly
differ between preliminary and permanent injunction contexts,188 it would
need to address that its recent decisions failed to discuss or impose any
187. Id. at 66–67.
188. See Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1148 n.3 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. Of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 546 n.12 (1987)).
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nexus requirement. For example, Presidio Components, Inc. v. American
Technical Ceramics Corp.189 and Edwards Lifesciences AG v. CoreValve,
Inc.,190 both of which were decided after Apple I and Apple II, involved
patented heart stents and capacitors where the accused products were
heart stents and capacitors, not larger products incorporating heart stents
and capacitors.191 However, no analysis was done to determine whether
the patented feature—as opposed to other features, marketing efforts,
pricing, et cetera—drove the demand for the infringing products.
If the nexus requirement is indeed a legal requirement for permanent
injunctions, one would think that the Federal Circuit would have remanded
those cases in light of Apple I and Apple II, even if the parties themselves
did not raise the nexus issue. To say that the nexus issue was simply not
implicated by the facts in all post-eBay cases until Apple I does not
appear accurate. In LifeScan, discussed above in Part V.B, the court
drew a line between an invention that is only one part of a product having a
“myriad of features” and an invention that is a “substantial part” of the
product, as a way to effectively avoid application of the nexus test. Even
there, where the nexus test was expressly discussed, the line-drawing
exercise failed to capture the full scope of the nexus inquiry, which
encompasses nontechnical reasons that accused products might be
purchased as well as technical reasons. Thus, the nexus requirement does
appear to be applicable even in cases where the patented features include
the majority or the entirety of the accused product, and the Federal
Circuit will need to squarely address this point to bring clarity to the
nexus doctrine and avoid more decisions such as LifeScan.
Along these lines, in i4i Limited Partnership v. Microsoft Corp., a
case decided after eBay but before Apple I, the Federal Circuit affirmed
the entry of a permanent injunction against Microsoft’s ubiquitous,
multifaceted, and powerful Word word processing and editing program.192
The patent that Microsoft was enjoined from infringing covers a modest
“custom XML” editor feature—an “add-on” functionality to Word that
enables Word to work with documents containing custom XML.193
Custom XML is only one of many markup languages that exist, and it
was estimated that only 1.9% of Word users even utilized the patented
feature. 194 Such facts strongly suggested that users of Word did not

189.
190.
191.
at 1307.
192.
193.
194.
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702 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
699 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
See Presidio Components, 702 F.3d at 1354; Edwards Lifesciences, 699 F.3d
598 F.3d 831, 840–41, 864 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Id. at 839.
Id. at 855.
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purchase the product because of its custom XML editor, but no discussion
of a causal nexus requirement occurred during the court’s irreparable
harm analysis.195 Nevertheless, the court deemed a permanent injunction
appropriate because i4i and Microsoft were direct competitors in the
custom XML market, i4i lost market share to Microsoft, and Microsoft’s
infringement “rendered i4i’s product obsolete.”196 In Apple I, the Federal
Circuit explained that
[t]he narrow injunction upheld by this court [in i4i] served only to protect the
patented product from obsolescence by its inclusion within Word. Here, in contrast,
the district court found that the alleged acts of infringement do not threaten to
have any such dramatic effects on the market generally or on Apple’s share of
that market.197

To the extent the nexus requirement applied, but was not stated, in i4i,
this market eradication rationale would appear to constitute an exception
to the nexus requirement that the Federal Circuit would need to clarify
en banc.
2. Is the Nexus Issue Better Considered Under eBay
Factors Three and Four?
Both the district court and the Federal Circuit have analyzed the causal
nexus between infringement and lost sales under the eBay factor of
irreparable harm. There is logic behind analyzing nexus in this light—
one cannot say a patentee’s lost sales harm the patentee in a way that
implicates the patentee’s patent rights unless there is some relationship
between the infringing sales and the patented feature. However, to require
proof that the infringing feature is essentially the reason that the infringing
product was purchased may go too far. As Apple argued in Apple I, maybe
it should be enough to show that the patented feature exists in the infringing
product and that the sale of the infringing product was a lost sale to the
patentee. That situation certainly presents a harm to the patentee that
directly treads on the patentee’s exclusive right and can be viewed as
irreparable harm, especially when coupled with additional factors such
as a direct competitive relationship and downstream lost sales.

195.
196.
197.

See id. at 861–62.
Id.
Apple I, 678 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
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Perhaps the same kind of analysis concerning the relative importance
of the patented feature can be more appropriately and more equitably
considered elsewhere in the injunction analysis. Although Judge Bryson
rejected the contention that causal nexus should be considered in the
context of eBay factors three and four, in Apple I, the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California in Brocade disagreed, stating,
“Whatever its ultimate merit where the particular irreparable harm
claimed is a loss of sales, that strict standard appears to move into the
irreparable harm analysis a consideration better suited for the equitable
factors of balance of hardships and public interest.”198
In denying Apple’s motion for a permanent injunction, the district
court made statements in connection with factors three—balance of the
hardships—and four—public interest—that are closely related to the nexus
inquiry purportedly relevant only to irreparable harm. Specifically, the
district court noted that Samsung was able to design around Apple’s patents
without considerable burden or expense, rendering the balance of the
hardships at worst a neutral factor.199 Presumably, it was the perception that
Apple’s patents standing alone encompassed relatively small or unimportant
features of Samsung’s products that enabled Samsung to implement designarounds without incurring substantial hardship. Indeed, if Apple’s patented
designs and inventions were central to the commercial success of Samsung’s
products, Samsung would not voluntarily design around the patents or
would find it to be an immense burden and cost to do so. The costs to
Samsung in implementing a design-around of highly important features
would extend beyond the cost of retooling and redesigning its products
and may well include lost sales due to Samsung’s inability to provide the
desirable features for its customers. On the other hand, as the district
court observed, “one who elects to build a business on a product found
to infringe cannot be heard to complain if an injunction against a continuing
infringement destroys the business so elected.”200 The more important
the patented features in the scheme of the infringing product, the more
unfair it becomes to deem the infringer’s hardship as cognizable. These
competing considerations allow for equitable weighing to take place in a
way that the nexus requirement for irreparable harm does not.
Similarly, the district court found that an injunction would not be in
the public interest essentially because “[t]he public interest does not support

198. Brocade Commc’ns Sys. v. A10 Networks, Inc., No. C 10-3428 PSG, 2013
WL 140039, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2013).
199. See Apple III Dist., 909 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1161–62 (N.D. Cal. 2012), rev’d,
727 F.3d 1214 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
200. Id. at 1161 (quoting Telebrands Direct Response Corp. v. Ovation Commc’ns,
Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1169, 1179 (D.N.J. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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removing phones from the market when the infringing components
constitute such limited parts of complex, multi-featured products.”201
The emphasis on the relatively small role the patented designs and
inventions were deemed to play in the infringing products once again
echoes the lack of nexus finding. Conversely, if the patented features
were driving the demand for the Samsung products, then the harm to the
public from an injunction would arguably be greater because it would
deprive consumers of a substantial source of the smartphone features
that they find especially important and useful. On the other hand, the
well-established importance of protecting patent rights in such a classic
unfair competition situation—particularly where the patented features do
not implicate public safety or health concerns—may well trump the
inconvenience to the public. Again, these competing considerations
would allow for equitable weighing to take place in a way that the nexus
requirement for irreparable harm does not.
Overall, if the facts of the case would satisfy the nexus requirement in
its current form for proving irreparable harm, then it is more likely that
the balance of the hardships, the public interest factors, or both would
favor the entry of an injunction. If the facts of the case would suggest a
lack of nexus, an injunction would be less likely upon consideration of
the balance of the hardships and the public interest. The district court’s
permanent injunction decision supports this view and gives credence to
the doubt expressed in Brocade about the propriety of evaluating the
nexus considerations exclusively in the irreparable harm analysis.
If the Federal Circuit were to modify and reallocate some of the nexus
considerations into the balance of the hardships and public interest
factors, the inflexible and onerous nature of the nexus test might be relaxed
to a point that allows for more robust consideration of fairness and
equity when presented with patents that cover only portions of infringing
products.

201.

Id. at 1163.
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3. Must the Nexus Requirement Be Analyzed on a
Patent-by-Patent Basis?
The district court explicitly and rigidly analyzed the nexus requirement
on a patent-by-patent basis, requiring that a patented feature or function
individually drive demand for the accused Samsung product in order for
the nexus requirement to be satisfied.202 However, when taken together,
Apple’s patented features and functions found within the accused products
undoubtedly take on a greater role influencing purchasing decisions.
When courts find that accused products infringe multiple patents—
patents that together reflect many core design features and functionalities of
the accused products—perhaps it makes sense to consider the effect of
those patented features and functions in the aggregate. Effectively, multiple
infringing features present in the same device may drive demand whereas
one feature alone might not. In that case, it seems equitable to find the
nexus standard satisfied as to the particular product.
If nexus must be found as to a single patented feature or function,
Apple’s patents, which are not exceedingly narrow in scope, will likely
continue to be insufficient to obtain any injunctive relief. As discussed
above, Apple I and Apple II, like LaserDynamics and Lucent, are all
probably correct that the individual patented features at issue in those
cases are not alone the reasons that consumers purchased the products.
If the nexus requirement remains as is, it is clear that Apple and similarly
situated patentees will have, at best, an uphill battle to obtain injunctions
in the future, particularly preliminary injunctions. Apportioning the relative
value and importance of each component’s contribution to a complete
product is not a straightforward or objective task, but an accused infringer
such as Samsung can fairly easily identify reasons that consumers buy
their products other than a patented design or any other hardware or
software features standing alone. The presence of Samsung’s goodwill and
brand recognition, as well as its products’ many software and hardware
functionalities not covered by Apple’s patents, especially in the aggregate,
can dispel the notion that a single patented feature is the reason purchasers
selected a Samsung product instead of an Apple product.
Although the Federal Circuit might have been comfortable with the
strict nexus requirement in the preliminary injunction context, once a
defendant is an adjudged infringer, the legal relationship of the parties is
very different and the Federal Circuit may be reluctant to completely
deny Apple injunctive relief as to its infringing direct competitor. One
way to achieve some equitable balance would be to allow consideration
of all infringed patents in the aggregate and their effect on consumer
202.

196

See id. at 1153.
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purchasing decisions. If multiple patents are infringed and those patented
features together comprise the reasons that drive customers to purchase
the infringing products, the harm from the lost sales is readily traceable
to Apple’s patents and injunctive relief should at least be possible.
4. What Evidence Suffices To Show Nexus?
As discussed above in Part VI.A, the district court provided detailed
discussion of Apple’s evidence offered to prove nexus and why it was
deemed insufficient but gave virtually no indication as to what evidence
would have sufficed. The district court’s dismissal of Apple’s evidence
largely boils down to the evidence allegedly being “simply too general”
and not expressly tied to the specific patents at issue.203 Apple made a
compelling case on appeal that the district court was unfairly dismissive
of Apple’s third-party praise and survey evidence tending to show that
the patented features drove demand.204 For example, Apple expressed
frustration in the face of the district court’s insistence that Apple’s
survey evidence, which showed that ease of use was a very important
consideration for purchasers, was entirely nonprobative because it failed
to clearly tie the survey evidence “to each patented feature.”205 Specifically,
Apple represented to the Federal Circuit that “no consumer survey can
readily ask consumers about particular patent claims or claim limitations
at that level of specificity.”206
Even if this representation is a bit overblown, when taken in light of
all the evidence,207 Apple made a showing of nexus that was at least entitled
to more weight than it was given by the district court, which effectively
gave Apple’s evidence zero weight.208

203. See id. at 1155.
204. See supra Part VI.B.3.
205. Apple III Appeal Brief, supra note 146, at 54–55.
206. Id.
207. The evidence included third-party praise and surveys that referred to the
patented features both generally and specifically. See supra Part VI.B.3 (discussing evidence
that referenced the “easy and intuitive” user interface, including the “two finger pinch,”
“bounce,” and “double tap” features, as well as the “beautiful,” “sleek,” and “rounded”
design, including the “shiny black face” that is “rimmed by mirror-finish stainless steel”).
208. See, e.g., Apple III Dist., 909 F. Supp. 2d at 1154 (“Apple makes no attempt to
prove that any more specific element of the iPhone’s design, let alone one covered by
one of Apple’s design patents, actually drives consumer demand.”); id. (“[E]ven if these
quotations did specifically reference the precise designs covered by Apple’s patents, they
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Given the manner in which the district court dismissed Apple’s evidence
outright, it appears that Apple could not have proven nexus without survey
evidence that poses a consumer with the question “Why did you buy this
Samsung product?” and the consumer’s answer specifically identifies a
patented design feature or functionality as the sole or primary reason.
Importantly, the consumer’s answer cannot be phrased in generalities—it
must identify a feature in a manner that specifically falls within the
scope of one of Apple’s patents. For example, with respect to Apple’s
U.S. Patent No. D593,087, shown below, it would not be enough to
answer, “I liked the design.”; one would have to answer to the effect that
“I liked the design having a flat front and rounded corners with a narrow
oblong opening for the speaker and a quarter-rounded bezel surrounding
the screen, which is rectangular and extends width-wise to the bezel and
length-wise toward the speaker opening but stopping short of the bezel.”

APPLE’S U.S. PATENT NO. D593,087, FIG. 41
Similarly, it appears that as to Apple’s U.S. Patent No. 7,884,915, it
would not be sufficient for a customer to say, “I like the intuitive and
easy-to-use design,” or even, “I like that I can pinch to zoom in on
images,” but would have to track the claim language more closely:

do not begin to prove that those particular features drive consumer demand in any more
than an anecdotal way.”).
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A machine implemented method for scrolling on a touch-sensitive display of a
device comprising:






receiving a user input, the user input is one or more input points applied to
the touch-sensitive display that is integrated with the device;
creating an event object in response to the user input;
determining whether the event object invokes a scroll or gesture
operation by distinguishing between a single input point applied to the
touch-sensitive display that is interpreted as the scroll operation and
two or more input points applied to the touch-sensitive display that are
interpreted as the gesture operation;
issuing at least one scroll or gesture call based on invoking the scroll
or gesture operation;



responding to at least one scroll call, if issued, by scrolling a window
having a view associated with the event object based on an amount of
a scroll with the scroll stopped at a predetermined position in relation
to the user input;



and responding to at least one gesture call, if issued, by scaling the view
associated with the event object based on receiving the two or more
input points in the form of the user input.209

Of course, no consumer would give such highly technical and detailed
answers to the simple question of why the consumer purchased a product,
which begs the question of how one can ever prove nexus.
Although surveys can be structured in many different ways, a less
open-ended form of questioning is likely to have methodological problems
that could diminish the weight or even preclude the admission of the
survey. For example, in the trademark litigation context where survey
evidence is commonplace, surveys can easily be discounted for poor
phrasing of questions or for asking leading questions.210 To ask Samsung
purchasers whether the patented features are what motivated them to buy
their phones or tablets would inherently require the questions to attempt
to accurately capture the scope of the claimed designs and invention.
Given the various nuances of claim interpretation and infringement analysis,
constructing such questions to be clear and understandable to the survey
subjects while still being accurate is like navigating a densely packed
mine field where any misstep can be fatal. For example, to explain how
a patent is to be interpreted and understood before asking whether the
209. U.S. Patent No. 7,884,915 col. 9 I. 52–col. 10 I. 28 (filed Mar. 16, 2007).
210. See generally 6 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair
Competition §§ 32.171–173 (4th ed. 2014).
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patented feature is the reason that the consumer purchased the product
could easily be criticized as the surveyor “lead[ing] the interviewee ‘along
the garden path’ to the desired response.”211
Under Apple I and Apple II, it is easy to understand what does not
satisfy the nexus test but almost entirely obscured is how one might
satisfy the test as a practical matter. The sole instance where the Federal
Circuit found nexus to be proven was for the ’889212 (iPad) patent, where
it emphasized the importance of design to tablet purchasers and the fact
that only two manufacturers, Apple and Samsung, “together controlled a
substantial share of the market.”213 Short of those circumstances, which
may apply only when brand new classes of products, not new models of
existing products, are emerging, no patented feature has satisfied the
nexus test on appeal.
The district court’s dismissal of the evidence in the permanent
injunction proceedings sheds no additional light on how to meet the nexus
requirement. To the extent that the Federal Circuit maintains the nexus
requirement in its current form, Apple’s arguments on appeal make a
good case that the current standard is essentially impossible to satisfy for
patents directed to components of larger products. If this was not the
Federal Circuit’s intention when endorsing the nexus requirement, then
further guidance as to how the test can be satisfied would be
immensely helpful.
5. Can an Appropriately Tailored Injunction with a “Sunset Provision”
Strike the Correct Equitable Balance?
As noted above in Part VI.B.4, Apple suggested that even if the nexus
requirement applies exactly as in Apple I and Apple II to permanent
injunctions and Apple failed to satisfy the requirement, it should not be
denied injunctive relief entirely. Rather, relying on the discretion of the
district courts in crafting injunctions and the analogous entire market
value rule precedent, Apple suggested that the district court could simply
structure an injunction to include a “sunset provision” that delays the
enforcement until the infringer has had sufficient time to design around
the patents. This, Apple proffered, would give meaningful effect to its right
to exclude under the patents, while being fair to Samsung, which purported
to have design-arounds in process that were not especially onerous. Apple

211. Id. § 32.172.
212. The Apple I court reached the irreparable harm analysis with respect to the ’889
patent because it reversed the district court’s finding that this patent was likely obvious.
678 F.3d 1314, 1332 (Fed Cir. 2012).
213. Id. at 1321, 1328.
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is correct that the entire market value rule operates to strike a fair balance
between the patentee and the infringer. If the infringing product includes
many features above and beyond a patented feature, the patentee cannot
obtain damages compensation that reaches beyond the value of the patented
feature but can still obtain some damages that more appropriately reflect
the patented component’s market value. For example, if the issue in Apple
v. Samsung were centered around damages and Apple’s patent were
directed to an improved smartphone battery, an analogy might be that
Apple would be denied damages of two percent of all Samsung’s profits
per phone—because purchasers do not buy phones for the batteries—but
Apple could obtain seven percent of all of Samsung’s profits per battery.214
This amount is likely less than two percent of profits from the entire
phones, but it ensures that Apple is awarded a fair scope of damages that
is commensurate with its patent rights.
Similarly, entering an injunction that prevents Samsung’s phones from
being sold but first allows Samsung a reasonable amount of time to design
around the patents strikes a balance that respects Apple’s exclusionary
patent rights but does not overcompensate it with an injunction that
harshly and immediately enjoins all features of a phone where many of
those features have nothing to do with the infringement. Indeed, if the
patented features and functions at issue do not drive demand and satisfy
the nexus test, then the burden on Samsung to design around such features
should be relatively small and the design-arounds should have little impact
on Samsung’s revenues. Samsung’s own conduct and evidence showing
that Samsung in fact did design around several of Apple’s patents suggests
this is the case.215 However, in the event that the courts take this sunset
provision approach, it should be noted that the burden on Apple and
other plaintiffs to obtain relief after such an injunction has been entered
requires a contempt proceeding and a relatively high burden of proof
that the injunction has been violated by clear and convincing evidence—
that there is no colorable difference between the new design and the
enjoined design.216 Although this could potentially lead to a great increase
in contempt proceedings and further increase the difficulty of obtaining
injunctive relief, the pace of technology advances in areas such as

214.
215.
216.
2013).

See supra Part IV.
See supra Part VI.C.2.
See ARRIS Group, Inc. v. SeaChange Int’l Inc., 732 F.3d 1346, 1350 (Fed. Cir.
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smartphones will often nullify the need for injunctions. New products in
such high-tech fields tend to become obsolete or commercially unviable
fairly quickly, as occurred with many of Samsung’s products by the time
a decision on the patent infringement merits was reached.
Ultimately, it is somewhat ironic that the entire market value rule
doctrine, the “driving demand” aspect of which makes the nexus test
virtually impossible to satisfy, is also the doctrine that may provide a
sensible escape hatch for a rule that would otherwise be draconian and
inequitable.
* * *
The nexus requirement seems to be a strict and inflexible rule that has
been applied harshly thus far against patentees to the extent it has not
been side-stepped.217 The Federal Circuit should be wary of adhering to
such rigid rules that are unique to patent cases. In at least three recent
landmark patent cases from the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court has
flatly rejected tests and analytical frameworks from the Federal Circuit
that were viewed as too rigid or patent-specific. In eBay, it was the
presumption of irreparable harm.218 In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex
Inc., it was the “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” test for combining
references to show obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103.219 In Bilski v.
Kappos, it was the “machine or transformation” test for patent-eligible
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.220 Given the importance and
pervasiveness of the standards for injunctive relief, if the Federal Circuit

217. Aside from Apple, another patentee was recently denied an injunction in part
on nexus grounds. In American Beverage Corp. v. Diageo North America, Inc., the patentee
asserted a design patent directed to a liquid-containing pouch. 936 F. Supp. 2d 555, 567
(W.D. Pa. 2013). The patentee and the defendant were direct competitors, both using
such pouches for their frozen alcoholic beverages. See id. at 568. The patentee’s request
for a preliminary injunction was denied in part because it failed to show nexus and in fact
argued against nexus by claiming that “frozen RTD pouches are impulse purchases made
predominantly based upon price and ‘appetite appeal,’ not the pouch shape.” Id. at 616.
218. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006) (holding
that “the [Federal Circuit] erred in its categorical grant of such relief” based on its “ʻgeneral
rule,’ unique to patent disputes ‘that a permanent injunction will issue once infringement
and validity have been adjudged’” (quoting MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 401 F.3d
1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated, 547 U.S. 388)).
219. 550 U.S. 398, 407, 415 (2007) (“We begin by rejecting the rigid approach of
the [Federal Circuit]. Throughout this Court’s engagement with the question of obviousness,
our cases have set forth an expansive and flexible approach inconsistent with the way the
[Federal Circuit] applied its TSM test here.”).
220. 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010) (holding that contrary to the Federal Circuit, “[t]he
machine-or-transformation test is not the sole test for deciding whether an invention is a
patent eligible ‘process.’”).
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does not somehow at least considerably relax the nexus requirement,
Apple may become yet another instance where the Supreme Court feels
the need to step in and strike down an unduly rigid legal framework.
VII. THE APPLE III FEDERAL CIRCUIT PANEL DECISION PAVES THE
WAY FOR EN BANC CONSIDERATION OF THE
NEXUS ISSUE
On November 18, 2013, a three-judge panel at the Federal Circuit
issued its decision in Apple III.221 The panel held generally that the nexus
requirement is here to stay for all injunction decisions, as it “reflects
general tort principles of causation equally to the preliminary and permanent
injunction contexts.”222 The court deemed the nexus test to belong squarely
within the irreparable harm analysis, as opposed to any other eBay factors
and to apply with equal force regardless of whether the injunction sought
was preliminary or permanent.223
As for the post-Apple I and Apple II cases, which decided injunction
issues without discussion of nexus, the Apple III panel held that the
absence of nexus may be due to the fact that the parties never raised or
challenged it.224 The panel expressly rejected the idea that simple
technology does not implicate the nexus requirement, although complex
technology does, holding that “the causal nexus requirement applies
regardless of the complexity of the products. It just may be more easily
satisfied (indeed, perhaps even conceded) for relatively ‘simple’
products.”225
The Federal Circuit rejected Apple’s suggestion that delayed enforcement
of injunctions tailored to infringing features would bring only a more
equitable balance to the nexus test.226 Although the panel agreed that
221. 735 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
222. Id. at 1361.
223. Id. (“[T]he causal nexus requirement is simply a way of distinguishing between
irreparable harm caused by patent infringement and irreparable harm caused by otherwise
lawful competition—e.g., ‘sales that would be lost even if the offending feature were
absent from the accused product.’ Apple I, 678 F.3d at 1324. The former type of harm
may weigh in favor of an injunction, whereas the latter does not.”); id. at 1362–63
(disagreeing with Apple that “there are significant differences between preliminary and
permanent injunctions that make the causal nexus unjustified and unnecessary for
permanent injunctions”).
224. Id. at 1362.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1363.
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delayed enforcement of injunctions can be equitable in general, there
was no reason to allow delayed enforcement only for permanent
injunctions, and absent proof of nexus to irreparable harm in the first
place, no injunction—delayed or otherwise—would be appropriate.227
Although the panel rejected Apple’s attempt to do away with the nexus
requirement entirely, it did “agree with Apple that certain standards
arguably articulated by the district court go too far.”228 The Apple III
panel generally approved of the district court’s insistence that proof of
nexus be tied to the patented inventions and designs.229 But the Federal
Circuit purported to scale back the test, which it referred to as “rigid”
and “categorical,” as follows:
However, these principles do not mean Apple must show that a patented feature
is the one and only reason for consumer demand. Consumer preferences are too
complex—and the principles of equity are too flexible—for that to be the correct
standard. Indeed, such a rigid standard could, in practice, amount to a categorical
rule barring injunctive relief in most cases involving multi-function products, in
contravention of eBay. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 393, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (rejecting
“expansive principles suggesting that injunctive relief could not issue in a broad
swath of cases”).230

Thus, the court relaxed the nexus test in three important respects that are
inconsistent with the test articulated in Apple I and Apple II.
First, the Apple III panel backed off of the idea that to prove nexus one
must show that the patented feature is the basis for customer demand for
the infringing product:
[R]ather than show that a patented feature is the exclusive reason for consumer
demand, Apple must show some connection between the patented feature and
demand for Samsung’s products. There might be a variety of ways to make this
required showing, for example, with evidence that a patented feature is one of
several features that cause consumers to make their purchasing decisions. It might
also be shown with evidence that the inclusion of a patented feature makes a product
significantly more desirable. Conversely, it might be shown with evidence that the
absence of a patented feature would make a product significantly less desirable.231

This “some connection” test is substantially weaker than, and flatly
inconsistent with, the plain text of Apple II, which required the patented
227. Id. (“[T]he purpose of the causal nexus requirement is to show that the patentee is
irreparably harmed by the infringement. Without such a showing, it is reasonable to
conclude that a patentee will suffer the same harm with or without an injunction, thus
undermining the need for injunctive relief in the first place.”).
228. Id. at 1364
229. Id. (“[T]his inquiry should focus on the importance of the claimed invention in
the context of the accused product, and not just the importance, in general, of features of
the same type as the claimed invention.”).
230. Id.
231. Id. (emphasis added).

204

[VOL. 51: 153, 2014]

Apple v. Samsung’s “Nexus” Requirement
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

feature to “drive[] consumer demand for the accused product.”232
Moreover, the Federal Circuit in Apple III used the same laptop battery
analogy but to reach a different conclusion. In Apple II, the Federal
Circuit held that “[t]he causal nexus requirement is not satisfied simply
because removing an allegedly infringing component [for example, a
battery] would leave a particular feature, application, or device less
valued.”233 In Apple III, however, the panel said,
[I]f a particular patented laptop battery lasts significantly longer than any other
battery on the market, then the replacement of that battery with a noninfringing
battery might make a laptop less desirable. In that case, it might be reasonable
to conclude that the patented battery is a driver of consumer demand for the
laptop.234

These statements are plainly inconsistent—the removal of a feature shows a
lack of value that either can or cannot prove nexus. Apple II required
affirmative proof of nexus, but now Apple III seems to accept negative
proof that absence of the features at issue affects demand. In doing so,
Apple III seems to have adopted the very reasoning it reversed in Apple II.
Second, although the Federal Circuit in Apple I and Apple II consistently
analyzed nexus one patented feature at a time, the Apple III panel agreed
with Apple that consideration of multiple infringed patents together is
appropriate:
While it is true that this court analyzed causal nexus on a patent-by-patent
basis in Apple I, we did not mean to foreclose viewing patents in the aggregate.
Rather, we believe there may be circumstances where it is logical and equitable to
view patents in the aggregate. For example, it may make sense to view patents in
the aggregate where they all relate to the same technology or where they combine to
make a product significantly more valuable. To hold otherwise could lead to
perverse situations such as a patentee being unable to obtain an injunction against
the infringement of multiple patents covering different—but when combined,
all—aspects of the same technology, even though the technology as a whole
drives demand for the infringing product.235

This sudden adoption of an aggregate nexus standard raises more questions
than it answers, but the panel “leave[s] it to the district court . . . to address
this issue in the first instance on remand.”236 For example, what are the

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Apple II, 695 F.3d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1376.
Apple III, 735 F.3d at 1364–65.
Id. at 1365.
Id.
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“circumstances” when it is appropriate to aggregate patents for the nexus
inquiry? Is it enough that the patented features are all useful and embodied
in the same accused product to say that they “combine to make a product
significantly more valuable”? In this case, looking at Apple’s infringed
patents in the context of Samsung’s products, more guidance on when
aggregation is appropriate would have been tremendously helpful.
Third, the Apple III panel believed that Apple’s survey evidence showing
the price premium that consumers would pay for certain features in a
smartphone should not have been discarded by the district court as
irrelevant, and it remanded to the district court to reconsider that survey
evidence.237 This view of the survey evidence is in considerable tension
with the Federal Circuit’s prior pronouncement in Apple II that “[t]o
establish a sufficiently strong causal nexus, Apple must show that
consumers buy the Galaxy Nexus because it is equipped with the apparatus
claimed in the ’604 patent.”238 To prove that a consumer finds a feature
valuable is not the same as proving that the feature is the reason consumers
buy the product.
The Federal Circuit rule is that prior panel decisions govern over later
decisions that are inconsistent with those earlier decisions, unless the
earlier decisions are overruled en banc.239 Thus, Apple I and Apple II are
controlling over Apple III where Apple III is inconsistent with the earlier
panel decisions, unless and until the en banc court overrules its prior
decisions.
This case, directed at the heart of the patent system—the right of
a patentee to exclude infringers—presents an exceptionally important
issue where the above-noted inconsistencies would tend to make en banc
consideration likely.240 Indeed, because the same panel of judges decided
Apple I and Apple III, only five of eighteen active Federal Circuit judges

237. Id. at 1368 (“[W]e see no reason why, as a general matter of economics, evidence
that a patented feature significantly increases the price of a product cannot be used to
show that the feature drives demand for the product. This is not to suggest that consumers’
willingness to pay a nominal amount for an infringing feature will establish a causal
nexus. For example, consumers’ willingness to pay an additional $10 for an infringing cup
holder in a $20,000 car does not demonstrate that the cup holder drives demand for the
car. The question becomes one of degree, to be evaluated by the district court. Here, the
district court never reached that inquiry because it viewed Dr. Hauser’s survey evidence as
irrelevant.”).
238. Apple II, 695 F.3d at 1376.
239. Newell Cos. v. Kenney Mfg., 864 F.2d 757, 765 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that
where there is a conflict among Federal Circuit precedential decisions, the rule is that the
earlier panel decision controls unless overruled en banc).
240. See FED. CIR. R. 35 (providing that en banc hearing of a case is appropriate
when the issues raised by the case are of exceptional importance or where en banc
consideration is necessary to ensure uniformity of the court’s precedent).
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have weighed in on the nexus issue.241 Other judges, for example those
in Douglas Dynamics, have addressed the irreparable harm requirement
without application of the nexus requirement, further compounding the
tension within the Federal Circuit on the entire irreparable harm prong
for injunctive relief.242 A matter of such importance to the patent system
is worthy of the entire court’s attention and consideration. Many amici
on both sides of the issue will likely encourage the Federal Circuit to
take up the nexus issue en banc.
* * *
As discussed above, the outcome of Apple III was a remand to the
district court for further consideration under a modified nexus standard.
On remand, the district court denied Apple’s renewed request for a
permanent injunction, finding the price premium survey evidence
unconvincing and viewing the aggregated effect of Apple’s infringed
patents insufficient to show nexus.243 Apple has appealed that decision.244
Thus, the nexus issue now appears to be teed up for Apple’s fourth bite
at the apple.

241. Apple I and Apple III were decided by Judges Bryson, Prost, and O’Malley.
Apple I, 678 F.3d 1314, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Apple III, 735 F.3d at 1355. Apple II was
decided by Judges Prost, Moore, and Reyna. Apple II, 695 F.3d at 1372; see also The
Court: Judges, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges (last
visited Apr. 18, 2014) (listing the Federal Circuit’s eighteen judges).
242. Douglas Dynamics, LLC v. Buyers Products Co. was decided by Chief Judge
Rader and Judges Newman and Mayer. 717 F.3d 1336, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2013). In a later
decision, Chief Judge Rader, along with Judges Lourie and Wallach, found irreparable
harm although acknowledging but not applying the nexus requirement, holding that “[a]s
direct competitors in a limited market, Broadcom’s harm was clearly linked to Emulex’s
infringement of Broadcom’s patent property rights.” Broadcom Corp. v. Emulex Corp., 732
F.3d 1325, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
243. Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK, 2014 WL 976898
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2014).
244. Apple Inc.’s Notice of Cross Appeal, Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No.
11-CV-01846-LHK (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2014), ECF No. 3026.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The concept of a nexus requirement has some legitimate policy concerns
behind it. It seems unfair to enjoin an entire product when only a small
part of the product infringes a patent. However, to insist that this
consideration factors only into the irreparable harm analysis, or to elevate
the nexus requirement above the eBay factors, is too rigid an application
of an otherwise sensible concept. To the extent the nexus requirement
remains good law, considerations of nexus best belong in the balance of
the hardships and public interest factors where there is greater flexibility
for courts to weigh the equities.
If nexus continues to be required to prove irreparable harm, the public
needs guidance of more than what will not suffice to prove nexus, but
what will. Presently, the type of evidence that seems to be required may
well preclude injunctive relief in the vast majority of cases that otherwise
justify an injunction, hence the apparent reluctance to strictly follow the
nexus precedent among the post-Apple decisions. And there is no good
reason to limit the nexus analysis to a patent-by-patent consideration. If
the same product is infringed by multiple patents and those patented
features together drive demand and cause the patentee to lose sales, the
nexus test should be deemed satisfied.
At a minimum, the entire market value rule doctrine that set us down
the path of the nexus requirement should be taken in full and not simply
for the disembodied notion of a patented feature driving demand. The
entire market value rule is not a bar to damages but a means to scale back
damages as appropriate and fair under the circumstances of the case.
Likewise, the failure to satisfy the nexus requirement should not be a
complete bar to injunctive relief when the equities otherwise would
justify an injunction. The scope of the injunction should instead be tailored
in a way that is appropriate and fair—enjoin the infringing feature, not
the product, and delay the enforcement of the injunction for a reasonable
time period to allow the infringer to design around that feature.
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